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Friedrich August von Hayek died at his home in Freiburg im Breisgau 
(Germany) on March the 23rd, 1992, at the age of ninety two. His death 
probably marks the end of an epoch of the science of economics: the epoch 
in which the great economists were also great intellectuals, not only conver­
sant with the technical subtleties of their own particular discipline, but also 
capable of fostering the growth of knowledge in the much broader field of 
the social and moral sciences.
The scientific itinerary followed by Hayek winds through a vast re­
gion, spanning a very long stretch of time: from the early 1920s to the 
present time, in about seventy years of untiring activity, he has been able to 
address a surprisingly wide and multifarious range of intellectual questions. 
Whoever scans his immense bibliography cannot but be impressed by the 
fact that his theoretical contributions concern virtually all the branches into 
which the social science is usually subdivided: from economics to epistemol­
ogy, from theoretical psychology to gnosiology, from moral philosophy to 
politology, from law theory to historiography, there does not seem to exist a 
single field of social thought that is not touched by his scientific production.
One might be led to interpret Hayek’s continual crossing of the tradi­
tional boundaries between disciplines as a symptom of intellectual restless­
ness and eclecticism, of a propensity to pursue a number of disparate and 
disconnected issues; but nothing could be farther from the truth. As a 
matter of fact, a unitary research program, characterized by a well-defined 
core of fundamental ideas, can easily be seen to underlie the whole of his 
scientific production, from the early contributions of the ’20s and ’30s,
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chiefly concerned with the economic debate of the inter-war period, to the 
more recent works of the 70s and ’80s, mainly belonging to the area of 
social philosophy and law theory. It is also apparent that Hayek s inclina­
tion to overstep the boundary lines conventionally (and often arbitrarily) 
drawn among the various branches of the social science arises precisely from 
his attempt to carry out this unitary research program, from his desire to 
develop those fundamental ideas that cannot be confined within the narrow 
limits fixed by tradition and crystallized by the academic specializations.
This of course, should not be taken to mean that the research program 
perseveringly pursued by Hayek through the whole of his scientific activity 
is perfectly defined, in its minutest details, from the beginning; nor should 
it be taken to mean that the core of his research program is free of any 
inconsistency or inner difficulty. On the contrary, the intellectual path fol­
lowed by Hayek reveals the traces of a discernible evolution and bears the 
marks of many changes of mind and course. Under such changes, however, 
one can always detect the existence of a unifying project and the effort to 
construct a coherent system of thought -  which sometimes requires the
abandonment of previously held ideas.
It is precisely this systematic tension, combined with the ability to go 
deeply into the most diverse areas of social thought, that constitutes the 
characteristic trait of Hayek’s scientific personality and distinguishes him 
from most contemporary social scientists. But this is also the reason why it 
is so difficult to enlist this author under the banners of the existing groups 
or schools of thought. Naturally, those who are satisfied with very rough 
classifications can dodge this difficulty with little effort: indeed, it is certain­
ly not a gross mistake to place Hayek among the supporters of the liberal 
tradition in politics or the advocates of the free market system in economics; 
or to put him among the foes of socialism and economic interventionism, or 
even among the critics of behaviourism in psychology and positivism in 
philosophy. But such classifications, as well as the many others of the same 
sort that might easily be suggested, are generic and superficial; moreover, 
they inevitably carry with them some ideological connotations, which are 
totally alien to Hayek’s approach. For Hayek, in fact, any given proposition 
or policy stance should only be judged on its theoretical merits; and in effect 
he never takes side for, or against, a certain position if he is not able to trace 
it back to his theoretical system and to evaluate it on theoretical grounds.
Of course, to underline the originality and complexity of Hayek’s 
system of thought is not to deny the existence of links, even important ones, 
with preceding or contemporary theoretical currents and cultural traditions: 
as a matter of fact, Hayek himself is very generous in acknowledging his
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intellectual debts. However, even when the influence of a given school or 
tradition is most evident, Hayek never accepts the received views without 
proceeding to an extensive and personal reelaboration, without trying to set 
those legacies of the past into a theoretical framework which is often radical­
ly new. This is especially true for that specific school of thought that most 
significantly affects the development of Hayek’s ideas, i.e., the so-called 
Austrian school. In fact, it cannot certainly be denied that Hayek’s views on 
epistemology and the methodology of the social sciences are deeply rooted 
in Menger s and Mises original reflections on the same subject; nor can it 
be disputed that Hayek’s approach to the theory of capital follows directly 
from Bohm-Bawerk s approach, nor that his theory of money and the trade 
cycle, as well as his criticism of “socialist planning”, draw their inspiration 
from Mises’ initial suggestions on the same issues. But, in all these in­
stances, Hayek goes well beyond the point reached by his predecessors and, 
on many occasions, he does not refrain from criticizing what he deems to be 
untenable in their positions.
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows. In Section 2 
we shall give a brief sketch of Hayek’s life and scientific career. Then, in 
Section 3, we shall investigate the theoretical reasons underlying an impor­
tant turning point in Hayek’s research activity; precisely, we shall try to 
explain why, in the early 1940s, after devoting twenty years of his life to the 
study of economic problems and the development of pure economic theory, 
Hayek decided both to significantly reduce his engagement in the field of 
economics in the strict sense, and to gradually replace the theoretical ap­
proach characteristic of economic theory with a new theoretical approach to 
the study of social phenomena. Indeed, it is our opinion that a discussion of 
that momentous change in Hayek’s research interests and methods will not 
only shed some light on the historical evolution of his system of thought, 
but will also highlight some issues of great significance to present-day econo­
mists and social scientists *.
2 . Hayek’s Life and Scientific Career
Friedrich August von Hayek was born in Vienna on May 8th, 1899
A more comprehensive account of Hayek’s life and scientific achievements can be found 
in D o n zelli (1988), on which the present paper is largely based. The same volume also 
includes an exhaustive bibliography of Hayek’s works (up to 1988) and extensive references to 
articles and monographs on Hayek and Hayekian themes by other economists and social 
scientists.
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into a family of scholars, scientists and academics, well connected with the 
university world of the old Austrian Empire. Soon after World War I, in 
which he had served as an officer of the K.u.K. army, Hayek enrolled at the 
University of Vienna, starting out in the study of law. In October 1921, just 
before receiving his Dr. Juris, degree, he took a job in the Österreichisches 
Abrechnungsamt (Austrian Discount Office, a government office for settling 
prewar debts), where Ludwig von Mises was one of the directors; this was 
the beginning of the intense intellectual relationship between Hayek and 
Mises. At about the same time Hayek helped to found a cultural circle, 
known as the Geistkreis, counting among its members economists (such as 
Gottfried von Haberler, Fritz Machlup, and Oskar Morgenstern), philoso­
phers (such as Felix Kaufmann, Alfred Schütz and Eric Vögelin), the mathe­
matician Karl Menger (the son of the economist), and many other social 
scientists. In 1923, immediately after obtaining a second degree in political 
science (Doctor rerum politicarum), Hayek took a leave of absence from his 
office and went to the United States, where he spent one year doing re­
search work (mainly in New York, at New York University and Columbia 
University). On his coming back to Vienna, in May 1924, he entered the 
Miseskreis (Mises’ Seminar), where a number of brilliant young economists, 
distinguished social scientists and even businessmen with an intellectual 
penchant used to gather to discuss economic, social and philosophical is­
sues: besides the members of the Geistkreis already named, also the econo­
mists Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Richard von Strigl, and Gerhard Tintner, as 
well as the banker-economist Karl Schlesinger regularly attended the meet­
ings of the Miseskreis; also a few foreign economists, such as Lionel 
Robbins, occasionally participated in the activities of the Seminar. In 1927 
Mises and Hayek co-founded the Österreichisches Institut für Konjunktur­
forschung (Austrian Institute for Research on the Business Cycles), which 
was directed by the latter up to his departure from Vienna in 1931. It may 
be interesting to note that, in a comment published in February 1929 in the 
Bulletin of the Institute, Hayek made a very precise and theoretically argued 
forecast of the crisis that, a few months later, would hit the United States 
and then the rest of the world.
In the meantime Hayek had started his career as a professional econo­
mist by publishing two articles, in 1924 and 1925, in the Zeitschrift für 
Volkswirtschaft und Sozialpolitik (later Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie)-, this 
was the journal of the Nationalökonomisches Gesellschaft (the Austrian 
Economic Society), of which Hayek was the secretary. Those articles, sum­
marizing Hayek’s American experience, concerned the monetary and stabili­
zation policies carried out in the United States in the early 1920s. Hayek’s
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initial interest in the theory of money and the study of economic fluctua­
tions further increased in the late 1920s, to become his main concern up to 
the mid-1930s. The first results of his research in this field were presented 
in two important contributions, published in German in 1929 and later 
translated into English as “The ‘Paradox’ of Saving” (1931a) and Monetary 
Theory and the Trade Cycle (1933a).
In February 1931 Hayek was invited by Robbins to give a series of 
guest lectures at the London School of Economics; such lectures, published 
in September of the same year as a slender book with the title Prices and 
Production, had an extraordinary and unexpected success. In the wake of 
this, Hayek was offered the prestigious Tooke Professorship of Economic 
Science and Statistics at the London School. By accepting the offer and 
moving to London in 1931, Hayek paved the way for that diaspora of the 
young Austrian economists that in a few years would disperse the Austrian 
school of economics all over the world.
The theses argued in Prices and Production received a generally favour­
able, and sometimes enthusiastic, reception. The only definitely negative 
reaction came from the group of Cambridge economists gathering around 
Keynes; the spokesman of this stance was Piero Sraffa who, in a long 
review-article in the Economic Journal (1932), leveled unusually sharp criti­
cisms at Hayek’s volume. But, with the expection of Cambridge, there was a 
time, in the early 1930s, when almost all the most renowned academic 
institutions appeared to subscribe to Hayek’s positions: at that time, in fact, 
the supporters of Hayek’s theory of the trade cycle used to occupy important 
positions not only, as natural, at the London School of Economics (where 
Hayek’s ideas were endorsed by the members of the so-called Robbins 
Circle, including Robbins, Hicks, Kaldor and Lerner) and at the University 
of Vienna (Mayer, von Mises and von Strigl), but also at Harvard (Hansen 
and Haberler), Princeton (Machlup), and a number of other institutions.
The success of Prices and Production notwithstanding, Hayek was clear­
ly unsatisfied with a few aspects of the model presented therein. While 
preparing a revised edition of the book (which eventually appeared in 
1935), he went on working on the theory of the trade cycle, publishing 
many articles of great interest2. At the same time, he tried to improve the 
theoretical underpinnings of his model, especially the theory of money and
2 Besides his reply to Sraffa, published as “Money and Capital: A Reply” (1932a), the 
following articles should also be mentioned: “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and 
Malinvestments” (English translation of a lecture delivered in Copenhagen in 1933 and 
published in German in 1935), in H ayek  (1939a), and “Capital and Industrial Fluctuations” 
(1934).
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that of capital, both of which appeared to be rather weak. As to the theory 
of money, he opened up a lively controversy with Keynes, by publishing a 
critical review-article of the latter s Treatise on Money ; further, he tried to 
clarify the somewhat obscure notions of “elastic currency and neutral 
money” that permeated the whole theoretical and policy debate of the inter­
war period 1 *4. As to the theory of capital, Hayek engaged in a huge effort of 
conceptual reelaboration, aimed at removing the imprecisions and mistakes 
marring the previous formulations of the Austrian (Bohm-Bawerkian) theory 
of capital, on which the original model of Prices and Production was essen­
tially based. In this regard, the development of Hayek’s ideas, marked by 
raging controversies 5, eventually culminated in the magnum opus The Pure 
Theory of Capital (1941), summarizing all of Hayek’s reflections over the 
previous decade and representing his last word on this subject.
Towards the mid-193 Os, however, while Hayek was still trying to 
strengthen his theory of the trade cycle in many respects, there suddenly 
occurred a change of opinion in the academic community: a few influential 
members of the Robbins circle (Lerner and Kaldor) started to be fascinated 
by the approach of Keynes, who just in those years was on the way to 
elaborate his General Theory, and broke away from Hayek’s field; also 
Hicks, without completely disowning his “Austrian” allegiance, began to 
take a more and more autonomous position. With the publication of Key­
nes’s General Theory in 1936, the decline of Hayek’s theory turned into a 
hasty and dramatic retreat: the theoretical conceptions and policy sugges­
tions advanced by Keynes in the General Theory were completely at vari­
ance with those put forward by Hayek in Prices and Production and his 
other works of that period; and, in the intellectual climate of the mid-1930s, 
when the ghost of the Great Depression was still haunting all the industrial 
economies, the activist stance of the former couldn’t but prevail over the 
severe and disenchanted message of the latter.
Left almost alone to defend his positions, Hayek did not give up 
fighting for a few years. In 1939 he published the long essay “Profits, 
Interest and Investment”, representing a further attempt to reformulate the
1 Cf. H a yek , “Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J.M. Keynes”, Economica
(1931c, Part I and 1932b, Part II). Keynes’s reply to the first part of this article was published,
together with Hayek’s rejoinder, in Economica, 1931.
4 Cf. H a yek , “Über Neutrales Geld” ’ (1933b) (translated into English as “On ‘Neutral 
Money’ ” in Hayek (1984)). A modified version of this article also appeared as an Appendix to 
Lecture IV of the second edition of Prices and Production.
' The heated debates with Pigou and Knight deserve special mentioning. On these 
debates, one may consult H a yek ’s articles “The Maintenance of Capital” (1935b) and “The 
Mythology of Capital” (1936), respectively.
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original model of Prices and Production and proposing, at the same time, to 
mount a direct attack on Keynes on his own ground (that is, by adopting a 
few assumptions typically regarded as “Keynesian”, such as the assumptions 
of extensive unemployment and of price and wage rigidities). And again, in 
the early 1940s, he tried to resist the rising Keynesian tide. In an attempt to 
answer the many objections that had been raised in the meanwhile against 
his theory of the trade cycle, Hayek made a final effort to clarify the 
obscurities surrounding his model in Part IV of The Pure Theory o f Capital 
(1941) and in the article “The Ricardo Effect” (1942a). Yet, after consider­
ing at length the embarking upon a complete revision of the theory of 
money and the trade cycle (which would constitute the subject of a separate 
volume, planned as the continuation of The Pure Theory o f Capital), Hayek 
eventually dropped the project. At the end of 1942, in utter disagreement 
with the prevailing trend of contemporary economic thought, convinced of 
having no chance of affecting the theoretical foundations of the new-born 
macroeconomic approach, and attracted by different questions, deemed to 
be more pressing (such as the questions of socialism, planning, and econom­
ic and political freedom), he finally quitted the field of inquiry that had 
absorbed his best energies for almost two decades.
At about the same time, a different but related line of research that 
Hayek had been pursuing since the late 1920s came to a turning point. Such 
line of research, concerning the meaning of the equilibrium concept in 
economics and the structure and use of general equilibrium theory, had 
progressively engrossed a larger and larger part of Hayek’s attention over 
the years. In his early works on money and the trade cycle, he had 
somewhat acritically endorsed the then prevailing interpretation of general 
equilibrium theory, based on a notion of stationary competitive equilibrium 
(essentially in Wicksell’s or Cassel’s vein). But already in 1928, in an article 
written in German that was to remain practically unknown for a long time 
outside a restricted circle of specialists, he tentatively suggested a new 
theoretical conception, resting on a notion of “intertemporal equilibrium” 
that was a true innovation for that time 6. Yet, what eventually led Hayek 
to engage in a work of systematic revision of the foundations of equilibrium 
theory was the inner awareness of the serious analytic shortcomings of his 
own theory of the trade cycle. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the 
1930s Hayek had reached the conclusion that “the fundamental problem of 
all economic theory [is to clarify] the significance of the concept of equilib-
C.f. H a y ek , “Das intertemporale Gleichgewichtssystem der Preise und die Bewegungen 
des ‘Geldwertes’ ” (1928), translated into English as “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and 
Movements in the Value o f Money”, in H ayek (1984).
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rium and its relevance to the explanation of a process which takes place in 
time”: as a consequence, the new generation of economists, including him­
self, ought to “endeavour to apply the methods and results of the pure 
theory of equilibrium to the elucidation of more complicated ‘dynamic’ 
phenomena”, of the type dealt with in his theory of money and the trade 
cycle 7. In accordance with this prescription, Hayek intensified his work on 
the equilibrium concept, also availing himself of his first-hand knowledge of 
the theoretical results achieved in those very years by the economists of the 
“Stockholm school” (particularly Myrdal and Lindahl) and Hicks.
After finding provisional expression in a few articles of the mid-193 Os, 
his research work in this area eventually issued in the publication of “Eco­
nomics and Knowledge” (1937), which is probably Hayek’s single most 
illuminating paper and can be rightfully regarded as a classic in economics. 
In this article Hayek not only precisely defined a notion of instantaneous 
equilibrium that would represent the basis of most subsequent work in 
general equilibrium theory, but also analyzed the fundamental question of 
the division of knowledge among the individual members of the economy, 
and discussed those dynamic processes of diffusion of knowledge through 
which an equilibrium might eventually be established. But, even if “Econom­
ics and Knowledge” succeeded in providing a satisfactory answer to some of 
the problems posed by general equilibrium theory, it still left many ques­
tions unsettled.
Hayek continued to work on these issues into the late 1930s, in an 
attempt to jointly reformulate equilibrium and capital theory. At the same 
time, the need for a thorough reconsideration of the foundations of general 
equilibrium theory was suggested to him by the somewhat paradoxical role 
played by that theory in the so-called Socialist Calculation Debate, a long- 
lasting controversy that had been originated by an article written by Mises 
in 1920 8 and in which Hayek had taken a very active part since 1935 9.
7 Cf. H a yek , “Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments”, in H ayek 
(1939b), pp. 135, 138. (This paper, originally written in 1933, had already been published in 
German as H ayek  (1935a)).
8 Cf. L. von  M ise s , “Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen” (1920), 
translated into English as “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” in H ayek 
(1935c). In that article Mises had maintained the impossibility of any rational calculation in a 
socialist economy, due to the lack of capital markets, and hence the inexistence of market 
prices for capital goods. Mises’ argument had prompted many a reply by the advocates of 
socialism, among which those advanced by the so-called “market socialists” in the mid- and late
1930s should at least be recalled (cf., in particular, D ick in so n  (1933 and 1939), and L ange  
(1936-37)). By using a particular interpretation of general equilibrium theory, those authors 
argued that some sort of decentralized “socialist planning” not only could provide a solution to
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The final result of such reflections, which eventually led Hayek to change 
his previous conclusions significantly, can be found in the first two chapters 
of The Pure Theory of Capital. The publication of this volume, therefore, 
marked the end of Hayek’s long and laborious investigations on the theory 
of economic equilibrium, in exactly the same way as it marked the end of 
his inquiries on the theory of capital and the trade cycle: as a matter of fact, 
the conclusions reached by Hayek in The Pure Theory of Capital, to which 
we shall come back in Section 3 below, were in a sense so negative as to 
induce him to gradually abandon the characteristic methods of pure econom­
ic theory and to open up a new line of research, no longer based on the 
concept of economic equilibrium, but on the alternative concept of a 
“spontaneous order”.
Thus, at the beginning of the 1940s, Hayek was ready to shift from 
the kind of approach to the social studies that he had followed until then, an 
approach centered on the analytic tools and methods of economic theory, to 
a different sort of approach, the details of which were yet to be defined. The 
transition to the new world, however, couldn’t possibly be made abruptly; 
and, in effect, for a few years (approximately up to the end of the 1940s) 
Hayek continued to be mainly concerned with problems stemming from his 
previous research in economics, though now viewed from a different angle.
A first line of research, intensely and uninterruptedly pursued by 
Hayek from 1941, regards the methodological and epistemological problems 
of the social sciences. Of course, Hayek had already come across this sort of 
questions in his theoretical works of the late 1920s and early 1930s, which 
are in effect scattered with occasional observations of a methodological 
character. Moreover, since 1936, his interests in this area had been further 
enhanced by his friendship with Karl Popper, the great philosopher of 
science. But it is only in the early 1940s, after deciding that pure economic 
theory could not by itself represent a sufficient basis for a comprehensive 
study of society, that Hayek started to pay systematic attention to epistemol­
the problem of coordinating economic activities, but would also grant a better solution than 
that allowed for by the “competitive market mechanism”. From a theoretical point of view, the 
paradoxical side of the controversy, that would soon attract Hayek’s attention, lay in the fact 
that the same theory, i.e., general equilibrium theory, could apparently be used by both groups 
of participants in the debate to support their opposing claims about the relative merits of the 
“competitive market mechanism” and “socialist planning”.
5 Hayek contributed three essays to the Debate: the first two were respectively the 
introductory and concluding chapter of the volume Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical 
Studies on the Possibilities o f Socialism, edited by Hayek himself in 1935; the third was 
published in Economica, 1940, under the title “Socialist Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solu­
tion’ ”. These essays were later reprinted, with minor modifications, in H a yek  (1949a).
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ogy and the methodology of the social sciences. The first results of his 
research in this direction found expression in the long and stimulating essay 
“Scientism and the Study of Society”, published in three parts in Economica 
in the period 1942-44 10. In this essay Hayek launched a frontal attack on 
what he viewed as the fundamental methodological fallacy of much theoreti­
cal work in the social field, synthetically labelled as “scientism”, as well as 
on the pragmatic counterpart of that fallacious methodological stance, origi­
nally called “engineering mentality” and later renamed “rationalistic construc­
tivism”; at the same time he passionately defended what he regarded as the 
correct method of the social sciences, based on the cornerstones of “subjec­
tivism”, “methodological individualism” and the so-called “compositive 
method”. On this we shall briefly return in Section 3.
The second line of inquiry carried on by Hayek during the 1940s is 
even more strictly connected with his previous work in economics; neverthe­
less, also in this case one can easily detect the change in perspective which 
had occurred in the meantime. As mentioned above, in the second half of 
the 1930s Hayek had actively participated in the Socialist Calculation De­
bate, acutely analyzing some of the theoretical issues and puzzles brought to 
the fore by that controversy. He then came back to the same topic during 
the 1940s; but, on this occasion, he proved to be more concerned with the 
political consequences of the pretence of rationally reconstructing society 
and planning its organization than with those economic problems, chiefly 
theoretical in nature, that had previously been at the center of his discus­
sion. In 1944 Hayek published The Road to Serfdom, a devastating critique 
of all forms of totalitarism; this book, which has been subsequently trans­
lated into sixteen different languages, made him famous all over the world 
as one of the most strenuous advocates of political and economic liberalism. 
Moreover, to strengthen the ideal of a “free society”, in 1947 he founded 
(together with other supporters of the same political creed, such as Milton 
Friedman and Fritz Machlup) the Mont Pelerin Society, so named after the 
place in Switzerland where it was founded and subsequently held its 
meetings.
Finally, the third line of research pursued by Hayek during those years 
is a natural offspring of his previous work on the division and diffusion of 
knowledge, begun in the mid-1930s, and may be regarded as a first attempt 
to apply to the study of economic and social phenomena that concept of a 
“spontaneous order” that, in Hayek’s opinion, was to replace the concept of
10 This work was later reprinted in revised form, together with some accompanying 
studies in the history of ideas, as The Counter-Revolution o f Science: Studies in the Abuse of 
Reason (1952a).
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economic equilibrium as the central intellectual tool of the social sciences. 
In this area, his most important contributions of that period were the 
articles “The Facts of the Social Sciences” (1943b), “The Use of Knowledge 
in Society” (1945), and “The Meaning of Competition” (this paper, contain­
ing the main argument of a conference delivered in 1946, was first pub­
lished in 1949, in the collection of essays Individualism and Economic 
Order).
In December 1949 Hayek resigned from the London School of Eco­
nomics, moving to the United States. In October 1950 he accepted 3 Profes­
sorship of Social and Moral Sciences at the University of Chicago, where he 
also became a member of the Committee on Social Thought together with 
Frank Knight, Milton Friedman and, later, George Stigler. This change of 
place and position marked the end of the transition period in Hayek’s scien­
tific life, which had lasted for almost one decade, and the beginning of the 
third and final stage in his intellectual itinerary.
During his stay at the University of Chicago, Hayek chiefly directed 
his research activity towards new fields of investigation. In 1952 he pub­
lished an interesting book in theoretical psychology and gnosiology, The 
Sensory Order, where the foundations of his epistemological positions are 
also stated; the origins of this essay, however, can be traced back to the 
early 1920s, when Hayek — as he himself reveals — was still uncertain 
whether to become a professional economist or a psychologist. In 1954 he 
opened up a new front of inquiry, by editing and introducing the volume 
Capitalism and the Historians, a collection of essays concerning economic 
history and historiography. But Hayek’s most important contribution of this 
period is undoubtedly The Constitution of Liberty (1960), a book aimed at 
specifying the limits of State intervention in the economic and political 
sphere; this essay, opening a new approach in political philosophy and 
public economics, can rightfully be regarded as the manifesto of neo-lib­
eralism.
In 1962 Hayek left Chicago and came back to Europe, where he 
accepted an appointment as Professor of Economic Policy at the University 
of Freiburg (Germany). During the 1960s he carried on the research pro­
jects he had already started before in the areas of political philosophy, 
methodology and philosophy of science; moreover, he continued his studies 
on the formation and evolution of economic and social institutions. At the 
same time, he initiated an ambitious research program in law theory and 
legal philosophy, trying to apply to this new field of social phenomena that 
approach based on the concept of “spontaneous order” that he had already 
used in connection with the more familiar economic phenomena; the results
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of this research, however, would not mature before the next decade. In
1967 Hayek published his Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, a 
vast collection of essays dating from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s. In
1968 he published in German an important article (later translated into 
English as “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”), summarizing his most 
recent reflections on the role of the competitive market process as a means 
for diffusing existing knowledge and creating new knowledge in the econ­
omy. Finally, stimulated by Hicks’s paper “The Hayek Story” (1967), 
which critically reconsidered a few controversial aspects of Hayek’s Prices 
and Production model, he returned to the theory of money and the trade 
cycle, a field he had practically abandoned since 1942, by publishing the 
article “Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect” (1969).
In 1969, after retiring at the University of Freiburg, Hayek accepted 
an honorary professorship at the University of Salzburg (Austria), thus 
returning to his native country after spending almost forty years abroad. 
Here he kept working on his research project on legal philosophy and the 
theory of social formations and institutions, which eventually resulted in the 
publication of the trilogy Law, Legislation and Liberty, the three volumes of 
which appeared in 1973, 1976 and 1979, respectively; in this magnum opus 
one can find the most systematic statement of Hayek’s views on the legal, 
constitutional and political framework required to support the market 
mechanism, as well as a fully-fledged exposition of his theory of the 
“spontaneous order” of the market. Besides this, during the 1970s Hayek 
embarked upon a lively campaign against what he deemed to be the 
dangerous mistakes of Keynesian policies, pointing out their harmful 
consequences, in terms of increased inflation and misallocation of resources, 
in both a series of conferences delivered all over the world and a number of 
papers, some of which were later collected in his New Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (1978).
In October 1974 the Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded him, 
together with Gunnar Myrdal, the Nobel Prize in Economics, for his contri­
butions to the theory of money, capital and the trade cycle. In his Nobel 
lecture, published in 1975 as “The Pretence of Knowledge”, Hayek revived 
his old critique of scientism and rationalistic constructivism, by arguing that 
such fallacious methodological premises continued to vitiate a significant 
part of contemporary economic theories and policies, and especially Keyne­
sian economics. At about the same time, Hayek’s concern about the crucial 
policy issues of the mid-1970s (in particular, the problems of inflation and 
price stability) led him to resume his old interests in monetary theory and
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policy. In two pamphlets published in 1976 11 he put forward a very radical 
proposal (further refined in a few later writings), representing the ultimate 
and revolutionary outcome of both his long research, dating from the 1920s, 
on the problem of the “neutrality of money”, and his reflections, dating from 
the 1950s, on the necessity of limiting the intervention of the State in the 
economic sphere: in its final form, Hayek’s suggestion was simply to abolish 
the State monopoly on the issue of legal tender, bestowing the right of 
issuing money to several private institutions competing with each other.
In 1977 Hayek left Salzburg for Freiburg, where he lived until his 
death. During the 1980s he devoted most of his time and efforts to his last 
great book, The Fatal Conceit (1988b), where he further developed his 
analysis of the unconscious social processes, extending the scope of his 
theory of the “spontaneous order” from the area of economic and legal 
phenomena to the field of cultural and moral traditions.
3. The Change in Hayek’s Theoretical Perspective in the Early 1940s: A 
Suggested Interpretation
As has been seen in the previous section, the early 1940s represent a 
sort of dividing line in Hayek’s scientific activity. We want now to investi­
gate the theoretical reasons behind the change in Hayek’s research interests 
and approach dating from that period. In this regard, it is convenient to 
distinguish two aspects that, though partly connected, call for different 
explanations.
In the first place, it should be recalled that Hayek’s long standing 
research program in the theory of the trade cycle, as well as in the related 
areas of money and capital, came to a sudden stop in 1942. As shown 
above, those topics, which had been at the center of his investigations 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s, were abruptly put aside at the end of 
1942 and almost completely neglected after that date (the only significant 
exception being the relatively recent proposal of monetary reform, men­
tioned in Section 2 ). But, apart from this most evident change in the main 
field of inquiry, in the early 1940s there also began a slower, though no less 
important, process of change in Hayek’s approach to the study of social 
phenomena: in fact, it is precisely in those years that Hayek started to 
question the analytic method and conceptual framework of economics, on *
"  Cf. H a yek , Choice in Currency. A Way to Stop Inflation (1976b) and Denationalisation 
of Money. An Analysis o f the Theory and Practice o f Concurrent Currencies (1976c).
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which he had unconditionally relied before, and set about developing a 
partially new method and framework for analyzing social phenomena.
Let us consider the first aspect first. On a number of later occasions, 
Hayek himself has suggested that the decision taken in the early 1940s to 
give up defending and developing his Price and Production model was 
essentially due to contingent reasons, such as the unfavourable climate then 
prevailing in the economics profession and the emergence of more urgent 
and absorbing questions. Yet, in our opinion, such psychological or sociolo­
gical motivations can only provide a very partial explanation of his sudden 
and complete retreat: as we have argued more extensively elsewhere 12, the 
chief reason for Hayek’s abdication lies in the simple fact that, after so many 
unsuccessful attempts at reformulating his theory, he eventually came to 
realize (though not to explicitly admit) that his basic model of the trade 
cycle was not only flawed, but also irremediably so, since the many particu­
lar improvements in the subsidiary theories of money, capital, and equilib­
rium undertaken in the course of time had only produced the unexpected 
effect of making the inconsistencies of the model as a whole even more 
evident.
In his generous endeavour to provide a systematic treatment of a 
variety of dynamic economic phenomena, Hayek had probably been overam- 
bitious from the very beginning of his undertaking. His original project was 
to construct a rigorously microfounded theory of the trade cycle, resting on 
a unified theory of prices, money, and capital. But the analytical tools he 
had at his disposal were desperately inadequate for that task: what he could 
rely upon, in fact, was only the very simple model put forward by Wicksell 
in Interest and Prices 13, that is, an essentially dichotomous, stationary-equilib­
rium model that had only been used by Wicksell to discuss the movements 
of the general price level, assuming all the fundamentals and the real varia­
bles of the economy (that is, preferences, production techniques, composi­
tion of output, relative prices, and the “natural rate of interest”) given and 
unchanging. Hayek immediately realized that WickselPs original model 
ought to be considerably modified and complicated in order to discuss those 
dynamic problems, characteristic of the trade cycle, that he was interested 
in. Thus, by taking seriously Bohm-Bawerk’s theory of capital, which had 
been completely neglected by Wicksell in his Interest and Prices model, he 
recognized that any divergence between the “market” and the “natural rate 
of interest”, induced by the behaviour of the banking system, would cause a
12 Cf. D o n z elli (1988, Section 4).
15 Cf. W icksell (1898) (English translation 1936). Cf. also W icksell (1901-06), vol. II.
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change in both the capital structure of the economy and the system of 
relative prices prevailing therein.
As soon became apparent, however, most of the conceptual framework 
originally adopted by Wicksell was inconsistent with the new and richer 
assumptions made by Hayek: in particular, the postulated dichotomy be­
tween the real and monetary part of the economy, the idea of a real station­
ary equilibrium unaffected by the monetary disturbances, and consequently 
the very notion of a “natural rate of interest”, on which Wicksell’s analysis 
ultimately rested, became simply meaningless under the new assumptions. 
This prompted Hayek to revise the received theories of money, capital and 
equilibrium, in order to make them consistent with the theory of the trade 
cycle he was endeavouring to elaborate. But, somewhat paradoxically, the 
undoubtable progress he was able to make in all these fields ended up by 
undermining the fundamental message he was trying to convey through his 
theory of the trade cycle.
This unfortunate outcome can be explained as follows. Hayek’s mes­
sage, which can be ultimately traced back to Mises, was simply the follow­
ing: while a monetary expansion can temporarily affect the economy, by 
distorting its capital structure, the underlying real factors will necessarily 
prevail in the long run; and it is precisely the inevitable reassertion of the 
real factors, only provisionally obfuscated by the policy of “elastic currency” 
pursued by the banking system, that will eventually put a check on the 
effects of the monetary expansion, thereby engendering the upper turning 
point of the cycle. Now, while the idea that there exists a persistent real 
structure of the economy that will eventually reassert itself is naturally 
suggested by a dichotomous, stationary-equilibrium model, such as Wic- 
ksell’s original one, the same idea loses all justification within a truly dynam­
ic framework of the type Hayek was striving to elaborate: for how can a 
persistent real structure of the economy be identified (or, for that matter, a 
“natural rate of interest” be defined), when continual changes in productive 
techniques, composition of output, relative prices, and rates of interest are 
explicitly allowed for? What are, under such conditions, the persistent real 
factors that are alleged to eventually prevail over the supposedly fleeting 
disturbances due to the monetary factors? Indeed, there is no consistent 
answer to such questions. But this means that, by perfecting his analytical 
apparatus and incorporating a larger and larger range of dynamic phenome­
na into his theoretical picture, Hayek unwillingly helped disclose the sim­
plistic character of his basic message and the untenability of his main con­
clusions.
It is beyond question that the eventual failure of Hayek’s long-run
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project concerning the theory of the trade cycle and related subjects con­
curred to shake his faith in the analytical powers of economic theory. But 
his dissatisfaction with the methods of economics, an uneasiness which was 
beginning to show itself in the early 1940s, was chiefly due to different 
reasons. And it is to these reasons that we now intend to turn.
The best starting point for tackling this question is probably repre­
sented by Hayek’s reflections on the scope and method of the social sciences, 
a subject on which he started to work systematically in the second half of 
the 1930s. According to Hayek, two are the characteristic objects of the 
social sciences in the strict sense of the word: on the one hand, such 
sciences have to deal with the conscious actions of the individual members 
of society, that is, they have to explain their intentional individual behav­
iour; on the other hand, however, they have also to deal with the social 
results of the efforts of many interacting individuals, that is, they have to 
account for those social processes which, being “the results of human action, 
but not of human design” 14, are “almost ex definitione not conscious” I5. 
Given the different nature of these two objects of study, the theories of the 
social sciences are forced to use two different kinds of explanations. In 
particular, in dealing with intentional individual behaviour they must neces­
sarily start from the knowledge and beliefs of the individuals whose actions 
they try to explain, as “only what people know or believe can enter as a 
motive into their conscious action” 16; for this reason, such theories cannot 
but be “subjectivistic”, in the sense that their ultimate “data” must consist in 
the subjective opinions of the individual members of society, in that frag­
mentary, and often inconsistent, knowledge on which the individuals base 
their intentional behaviour. But, when it comes to explaining the overall 
processes taking place in the social world, a different sort of explanatory 
scheme is required: for, since the social processes are undesigned and often 
uncomprehended by anybody, any explanation based on the intentions of 
some individual member of society would be utterly out of place in this 
connection. Yet, the social sciences have to recognize that, independently of 
the will and intentions of any single individual, some sort of “spontaneous 
order” tends to emerge in most social processes: any such order consists in a 
stable pattern of relationships between the actions of the individuals partici­
pating in the process and, at the same time, represents the condition for the
14 This sentence, drawn from Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society 
(1767), has been repeatedly used by Hayek to summarize his interpretation of the nature of 
social formations. Cf., e.g., H ayek  (1967b).
15 Cf. H ayek  (1952a, p. 87).
16 Cf. H ayek  (1952a, p. 35).
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achievement of the ends at which those individuals aim. In most cases, 
however, such an order cannot be directly observed by the social scientist: it 
can only be theoretically reconstructed by a deliberate effort of directed 
thought, starting from the simple elements of which the comparatively more 
complex phenomenon is composed, that is, from the actions of the individ­
uals participating in the process. According to Hayek, it is precisely this 
method of theoretically reconstructing the so-called “social wholes” from 
their constituting elements, called the “compositive” or “individualistic” 
method, that represents the hallmark of the social sciences proper.
From this perspective, the main question facing the social sciences is 
how to combine into a coherent theoretical framework the two kinds of 
explanatory schemes they have to use in order to account for both the 
intentional and the unintended phenomena falling under their jurisdiction. 
With a view to clarifying this issue, in the second half of the 1930s Hayek 
turned to a systematic analysis of the methods employed by the science of 
economics, that he then regarded as the most advanced among the social 
sciences. By looking at the actual practice followed by past and contempo­
rary theoretical economists, Hayek pointed out that their efforts had been 
chiefly directed at the preliminary task of analyzing the rational choices 
made by the individual members of the economy. He further remarked that, 
by taking a consistently “subjectivistic” stance, that branch of economic 
theory concerned with the individual process of rational choice (namely, the 
“Pure Logic of Choice” or the “Economic Calculus”, in Hayek’s own words) 
had been able to make great progress in recent times. But, according to 
Hayek, its achievements ought not to be unduly emphasized: for, taken by 
itself, the Pure Logic of Choice is unable to explain any observable phe­
nomenon, and consequently cannot be regarded as an empirical theory.
What Hayek meant by this can be easily seen by considering the 
characteristic structure of the explanations offered by the so-called Econom­
ic Calculus. In any such explanation, the first thing the theorist has to do is 
to take as given the subjective knowledge and preferences of the individual 
whose choices are to be explained; then, starting from such “subjective 
data”, he can proceed to logically deduce the plan (or plans) of action 
rationally chosen by that individual under the assumed conditions. But, if 
this is the typical structure of the explanations provided by the Economic 
Calculus, it should be clear that such theory can neither explain how the 
individuals come to possess the knowledge they are supposed to have, nor 
account for the individuals’ observable behaviour. For any such explanation 
can at most account for the plan of action that an individual would rational­
ly choose to carry out under the postulated circumstances; but, as the
18 FRANCO DONZELLI
chosen plan may well be unfeasible (given the subjective character of he 
individual’s knowledge), that plan will not necessarily coincide with t e 
individual’s observable behaviour. It follows that, if economics is to be a 
truly empirical science, the Pure Logic of Choice has to be supplemented by 
a different sort of theory, one aimed at analyzing the social processes 
through which knowledge is created and conveyed to the individual mem­
bers of the economy, rationally chosen plans of action are turned into 
observable actions and individuals’ choices are progressively revised in the
light of experience. . „ ■
It is at this point that General Equilibrium Theory comes into th
picture: for, among all the theories of economics, General Equilibrium 
Theory is undoubtedly the one that has most seriously taken upon itself the 
task of combining the Pure Logic of Choice, characteristic of all modern 
(neoclassical) economics, with a study of the social interactions taking place 
among many different individuals in a market economy. And this is why, in 
the second half of the 1930s, Hayek’s central theoretical concern became 
that of assessing to what extent General Equilibrium Theory, viewed as 
the core of all theoretical economics, could in effect provide a satisfactory 
answer to the fundamental problem of the social sciences.
In order to tackle this issue, Hayek had first to put forward a general 
definition of the abstract equilibrium concept underlying the many particu­
lar models belonging to the General Equilibrium approach, broadly con­
ceived. This preliminary task was in effect accomplished in his 1937 paper, 
“Economics and Knowledge”, where the abstract properties characterizing 
the equilibrium notion, as it is employed in General Equilibrium Theory, 
were clearly stated for the first time in the history of the subject. In tact 
that paper defined a general economic equilibrium as a particular state of 
the economy at a certain point of time, in which the subjective knowledge 
and beliefs of the various individuals participating in the economy are 
arranged in such a way that the plans of actions rationally chosen by all the 
individuals, on the basis of such knowledge and beliefs, are consistent wit 
each other, as well as with the external constraints posed by the environ­
ment, so that they can all be carried out. In the light of this interpretation of 
the equilibrium notion, Hayek could then proceed to evaluate the capability 
of General Equilibrium Theory to serve as a robust foundation for an 
empirical theory of society.
In this respect, one can easily see that General Equilibrium Theory, 
when interpreted as Hayek suggested, is in effect able to overcome one 
characteristic limitation of the Pure Logic of Choice: for, by assuming t e 
economy to be in equilibrium, General Equilibrium Theory is no longer
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confined to merely explaining the individuals’ rationally chosen plans 
of action, but it is able, at least in principle, to explain their observed 
behaviour as well. However, as Hayek did not fail to point out, this result 
can only be achieved by assuming that an equilibrium prevails in the econ­
omy, that is, by assuming that the knowledge of the various individuals are 
arranged in a very special way. But to assume this special arrangement of 
the individuals’ knowledge, as is typically done in General Equilibrium 
Theory, is something altogether different from explaining the process 
through which such arrangement is, or can be, brought about. Yet it is 
precisely the latter kind of explanation that ought to be provided in order to 
turn General Equilibrium Theory into a truly empirical endeavour. As 
Hayek (1937, pp. 43-4) put it: “Whatever may occasionally have been said 
by over-pure economists, there seems to be no possible doubt that the only 
justification for [our concern with the admittedly fictitious state of equilib­
rium] is the supposed existence of a tendency towards equilibrium. It is 
only with this assertion that economics ceases to be an exercise in pure logic 
and becomes an empirical science [...]. The only trouble is that we are still 
pretty much in the dark about (a) the conditions under which this tendency 
is supposed to exist, and {b) the nature of the process by which individual 
knowledge is changed”.
Of course, in writing his 1937 paper, Hayek was perfectly aware of the 
many attempts that had been made in the past, chiefly within the framework 
of general competitive analysis, in order to account for the process supposed­
ly driving the economy towards an equilibrium. However, already in the 
early 1930s, he had arrived at the conclusion that such efforts had led 
economic theory to a dead end. In effect, what had been done by most 
economic theorists in the previous fifty years had been to informally discuss 
the process of adjustment towards a competitive equilibrium under the 
assumption of an absolutely unchanging environment; and this almost exclu­
sive concern with stationary adjustment processes helps explain why in the 
same period the equilibrium notion adopted by most economists (such as 
Wicksell, J.B. Clark, Cassel, Pigou and many others) had been that of a 
stationary competitive equilibrium. But, as Hayek (together with Lindahl 
and Hicks) had come to realize in the early 1930s, stationary equilibrium 
theory could only be consistently applied to a very limited set of economic 
phenomena, to which all the interesting dynamic phenomena at the center of 
the theoretical debate in the in ter-war period did not belong. Moreover, the 
unwarranted attempts to surreptitiously extend the scope of stationary equi­
librium theory beyond its intrinsic limits had led to a number of mistakes 
that had seriously hampered the development of theoretical research, partic-
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ularly in the crucial fields of money, capital and interest. This is the reason 
why, in “Economics and Knowledge”, Hayek explicitly rejected the then 
prevailing notion of stationary equilibrium, returning instead to that instanta­
neous interpretation of the general equilibrium concept that, originally sug­
gested by Walras and Pareto, had later fallen into disuse and had almost 
completely been forgotten. Yet, while insisting that an equilibrium state 
should be referred to a given instant in the history of the economy, without 
implying any stationarity of either the environment or the economic varia­
bles, Hayek still cherished the hope that such instantaneous equilibrium 
approach might eventually be supplemented with the analysis of an equilib­
ration process taking place in time, a step on which the empirical character 
of General Equilibrium Theory crucially depended.
Yet Hayek’s hopes, still confidently expressed in his 1937 paper, were 
to be disappointed by the subsequent development of his research. In partic­
ular, the vanishing of his expectations about the future of General Equilib­
rium Theory was greatly speeded up by his participation in the Socialist 
Calculation Debate in the late 1930s. As remarked above, Hayek’s main 
theoretical concern during that Debate was to solve the puzzle posed by the 
fact that General Equilibrium Theory, a theory which had certainly been 
viewed by its original propounders as an idealized representation of the 
working of a free market economy, could be used by many advocates of 
socialism to support their claims for the superiority of some sort of socialist 
planning” over the “competitive market mechanism”. As a matter of fact, 
there were two distinct ways in which the supporters of “socialist planning 
made use of General Equilibrium Theory in order to uphold their positions. 
First, in an early stage of the Debate, it was suggested that the difficulty 
raised by the lack of markets, and consequently of market prices, in a 
socialist economy could be overcome by directly solving the equations de­
scribing the competitive equilibrium model of the economy. Then, in a later 
stage, the so-called “market socialists” (namely, Dickinson and Lange) ad­
vanced the more sophisticated suggestion that a mechanism similar to the 
Walrasian tâtonnement, in which, however, the Central Planning Bureau 
would serve as an explicit auctioneer and the managers of the State indus­
tries would be required to behave as price-taking competitive agents, could 
be employed to determine by trial and error the equilibrium prices to be 
used as a basis for an efficient allocation of resources in a decentralized 
socialist economy.
As is well-known, to the first proposal Hayek objected that, even apart 
from any problem concerning either the mathematical solvability of the 
equations describing the competitive equilibrium model of the economy or
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the practical computability of an equilibrium solution, no attempt to com­
pute a numerical solution could even be undertaken unless the so-called 
“data” appearing in the equations of the model were actually known to those 
in charge of finding such solution. But, as those “data” ultimately consist in 
the subjective knowledge of the individuals participating in the economy, as 
that knowledge is dispersed among millions of different individual minds, 
and finally as the individuals’ subjective knowledge often takes the form of 
“tacit knowledge”, that is, knowledge that is not consciously possessed even 
by those who make use of it, there is no way of making the so-called “data” 
available to the central body supposedly in charge of numerically solving the 
equations. To this substantive point Hayek added an important methodologi­
cal remark, which recurs over and over again in his later writings. Precisely, 
he pointed out that the misleading suggestion to numerically solve the 
equations of the competitive equilibrium model directly followed from a 
gross misconception of the epistemological status of General Equilibrium 
Theory. In fact, to advance that suggestion was to interpret General Equilib­
rium Theory as “an explanation which enables us to predict the precise 
result of any concrete situation”, whereas such theory, as many other theo­
ries dealing with the complex phenomena characteristic of the social 
sciences, should be viewed as “an explanation merely of the principle on 
which a phenomenon is produced” 17.
Let us turn now to the proposal put forward by the “market socialists” 
in the second half of the 1930s. Against this approach Hayek raised two 
distinct kinds of objections. In the first place, he pointed out that the 
implementation of the method devised by Dickinson and Lange for deter­
mining the equilibrium prices would, in effect, demand a lot of monitoring 
from the Central Planning Bureau. Due to the lack of incentives and sanc­
tions automatically provided by the competitive market mechanism, the 
only way by which the Central Authority might hope to force the State 
managers to behave according to the stated rules would be to subject their 
behaviour to systematic inspection. But, in order to assess the conformity of 
the managers’ behaviour to the rules, such Authority ought to possess a 
detailed knowledge of the special circumstances of time and place under
17 Cf. H ayek  (1952a, pp. 42-3). To this he added: “The best illustration in the field of the 
social sciences [of an explanation merely of the principle on which a phenomenon is produced] 
is probably the general theory of prices as represented, e.g., by the Walrasian or Paretian 
systems of equations. These systems show merely the principle of coherence between the prices 
of the various types of commodities of which the system is composed; but without knowledge 
of the numerical values of all the constants which occur in it and which we never do know, 
this does not enable us to predict the precise results which any particular change will have”.
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which they operate. This means, however, that the implementation of the 
method suggested by the “market socialists” would not escape the problem 
of centralizing all the dispersed and “tacit” knowledge of society in a single 
mind, so that, in the end, the same criticism leveled at the first proposal 
would apply to the second one as well. Apart from this, however, Hayek 
also developed a second line of attack, which is particularly interesting for 
our present purposes. In fact, in discussing the adjustment process envis­
aged by Lange, a process made up of successive revisions of prices carried 
out by the Central Authority and of consequent changes in plans effected 
by the production managers and consumers, he forcibly underlined the 
shortcomings and inconsistencies implicit in that otherwise ingenious 
attempt to provide a “realistic” reinterpretation of the artificial construct of 
the Walrasian tâtonnement. In essence, Lange’s construction was to be 
blamed for the following: first, it was unable to explain why the production 
managers should “stupidly” behave as price-takers, while knowing that the 
prices would be changed by the Central Authority once out of equilibrium; 
second, it was unable to account for the agents’ disequilibrium behaviour, 
though explicitly recognizing that such behaviour would indeed occur 
during the adjustment process; third, in order to make the equilibrium 
position determinate, it was forced to inconsistently assume away all 
changes in the “data”, even those changes that would necessarily ensue from 
the agents’ out-of-equilibrium behaviour 18.
The critical conclusions arrived at by Hayek in commenting upon 
Lange’s reinterpretation of the Walrasian tâtonnement as a real process 
taking place in time most probably contributed to shake his faith in the 
possibility of supplementing instantaneous equilibrium theory with an analy­
sis of the dynamic processes that are supposed to bring an equilibrium state 
about. In any case, such faith had been entirely lost by 1941, when he 
finally published his great book The Pure Theory of Capital. Here, in fact, 
by completely reversing his 1937 position, and embracing instead that 
stance that he had sharply criticized in “Economics and Knowledge” as 
characteristic of a few “over-pure economists” uninterested in the empirical 
content of the theory, Hayek explicitly maintained that the general equilib­
rium concept ought to be viewed as a mere “intellectual tool”. To this he 
added that “it seems to be a weakness of the traditional use of the concept 
of equilibrium that it has been confined to cases where some specious 
‘reality’ could be claimed for it. In order to derive full advantage from this 
technique we must abandon every pretence that it possesses reality, in the
18 Cf. H ayek (1940, especially sections 5-8).
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sense that we can state the conditions under which a particular state of 
equilibrium would come about” 19.
Now, the new position taken by Hayek in 1941 about the meaning of 
the equilibrium concept and the scope and limitations of the equilibrium 
approach forced him to face the following dilemma: on the one hand, there 
was pure economic theory, hinging on an abstract and “unrealistic” equilib­
rium construct for which no empirical justification could be offered; on the 
other, there were the all-important dynamic processes of creation and diffu­
sion of knowledge, of coordination of individual plans and actions, etc., 
which had certainly represented the original justification for, and the implic­
it foundation of, General Equilibrium Theory, but could not formally 
be treated within that framework. Confronted with this dilemma, Hayek 
gradually worked out a possible solution: precisely, he came to the conclu­
sion that, if the dynamic processes of the real world could not be analyzed 
by means of the tools and methods of pure economic theory, one had to give 
up that theory, replacing it with an alternative theoretical system. Further­
more, since pure economic theory rested on the equilibrium concept, one 
also had to abandon that concept, using instead some other notion as the 
cornerstone of a new theory of society. The notion suggested for playing 
that ambitious role was the old notion of a “spontaneous order”, a notion 
which had been embryonically present in Hayek’s theoretical system since 
his early days, but could only be adopted as the organizing concept of his 
research activity after twenty years devoted to investigating the powers and 
shortcomings of General Equilibrium Theory.
As has been shown above, the chief reason for Hayek’s dissatisfaction 
with a theory centered on the equilibrium construct lay in his final persua­
sion that such a theory would be unable to cope with the dynamic processes 
taking place in the social world. But, after much thought about the argu­
ments put forward by the economists siding up with either party during the 
Socialist Calculation Debate, he also convinced himself that the equilibrium 
technique characteristic of economics was quite dangerous in two further 
respects, to which he had not paid enough attention before.
The first dangerous implication of General Equilibrium Theory was 
due, according to Hayek, to the very structure of that theory. As remarked 
above, during the Calculation Debate Hayek had convincingly refuted the 
^socialist interpretation of the Walrasian competitive equilibrium model as 
“an explanation which enables us to predict the precise result of any 
concrete situation ’, arguing instead that the only reasonable interpretation
19 Cf. H ayek (1941, pp. 27-8).
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of that model, which incidentally was the same as Walras’s and Pareto’s 
original one, is to view it as “an explanation merely of the principle on 
which a phenomenon is produced”. However, upon further reflection, 
Hayek came to the conclusion that General Equilibrium Theory is in effect 
so structured as to allow for (or, at least, not to discourage) something like 
the “socialist” interpretation of it. Such theory, in fact, is characterized by a 
potentially deterministic formal structure. That is, it is formalized in such a 
way as to suggest, albeit implicitly, that one can actually use it to associate 
an equilibrium configuration of the economic variables (quantitatively 
specified in its minutest details) to any given configuration of the “data” 
(similarly expressed in quantitative terms). But then the fact that Walras 
and Pareto had been far from regarding General Equilibrium Theory as a 
tool for computing equilibrium prices and quantities could not cancel the 
fact that they had built a theory which dangerously lent itself to being 
interpreted as an “explanation of the precise result”, rather than as an 
“explanation merely of the principle”. And, as Hayek came to think in the 
early 1940s, this possible confusion was in itself a sufficient reason for 
keeping one’s distance from the equilibrium approach.
At about the same time Hayek became aware of a second danger 
ensuing from equilibrium analysis; precisely, he began to be concerned with 
the fact that, by overemphasizing the significance of the equilibrium posi­
tions of the economy, such analysis tended to direct the theorist’s attention 
away from the more fundamental questions concerning the out-of-equilib­
rium behaviour of the system. Once more, this issue had clearly emerged 
during the Calculation Debate. In fact, most economists taking part in that 
controversy on either side had essentially couched their arguments in terms 
of the properties of the equilibrium position to be eventually reached by 
either method: thus, many supporters of the “competitive market mecha­
nism” had confined themselves to praising the efficiency properties of com­
petitive equilibrium, whereas the advocates of socialism had tried to show 
that a competitive equilibrium could be more easily obtained by means of 
some sort of “socialist planning”. But, as Hayek first pointed out in his 1940 
contribution, the superiority of the “competitive market mechanism” over 
“socialist planning”, or vice versa, would ultimately depend not on the prop­
erties of an equilibrium position, which would never be reached in either 
case, but rather on the disequilibrium behaviour of the economy. And, 
according to Hayek, it was in this latter sense, and in this sense only, that 
the claim for the superiority of the “competitive market mechanism” could 
be legitimately laid, owing to the special fitness of that “mechanism” for
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quickly reacting to the continual changes in the economic environment and 
the ensuing disequilibrium.
In conclusion, the realization of the potential risks associated with 
equilibrium analysis was the final element which contributed to Hayek’s 
change in perspective in the early 1940s, as well as to his adoption of an 
alternative approach based on the concept of a “spontaneous order”. The 
following remarks may help explain why Hayek came eventually to prefer 
the latter notion to the equilibrium concept in his theoretical research. In 
the first place, a “spontaneous social order” is defined by Hayek as a 
qualitative relational structure, to which a number of different quantitative 
relationships may correspond: hence, no one can ever be misled into inter­
preting a theory based on such construct as “an explanation of the precise 
result”, which instead may easily happen with General Equilibrium Theory. 
In the second place, as Hayek explicitly points out in some of his later 
writings 20, while it is possible to maintain that an order is preserved 
through a process of change, the same cannot of course be said of an 
equilibrium state. This means, however, that the first concept, unlike the 
second, can be employed for theoretically discussing those dynamic pro­
cesses which, in Hayek’s opinion, are so central to the social sciences. 
Finally, the notion of an “economic order”, as defined by Hayek, is consis­
tent with the existence of a disequilibrium situation in the economy; it may 
even be added that the occurrence of a certain amount of disequilibrium is a 
necessary condition for the preservation of an “economic order”, an occur­
rence that cannot possibly be true of the equilibrium concept as employed in 
General Equilibrium Theory. Of course, what is gained in flexibility and 
fruitfulness by using the concept of a “spontaneous order”, is lost in preci­
sion and determinateness; but since, according to Hayek, the deterministic 
character and predictive power of equilibrium analysis are ultimately decep­
tive, such a loss should not be really regretted.
In accordance with the conclusions reached during the 1940s, Hayek 
thereafter proceeded to develop his theory of the “spontaneous order”, try­
ing to apply it to a larger and larger variety of social phenomena for the rest 
of his lifetime (as explained in Section 2 ). Yet, the success of his proposal 
with the economics profession strictly speaking has been quite limited: 
indeed, with the exception of Hayek’s direct followers and a few other 
heterodox theorists, most economists have continued working with the tradi­
tional tools and methods of equilibrium analysis. This may have depended 
on the exceedingly firm grip of scientistic habits and deterministic illusions
20 Cf., e.g., H a y e k  (1968).
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on the economics profession, as Hayek has repeatedly lamented in recent 
times; or else it may have depended on Hayek’s inability to convince his 
fellow economists of the superiority of his own approach. In any case, 
Hayek’s ideas and suggestions will continue for a long time to represent an 
extraordinary challenge to the present and future generations of economists.
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FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK (1899-1992)
Questo lavoro si propone di delineare e discutere brevemente i principali 
risultati scientifici conseguiti dal grande economista e scienziato sociale Friedrich 
August von Hayek, Premio Nobel per l’Economia, morto il 23 marzo 1992 nella 
sua casa di Freiburg im Breisgau (Germania). Il lavoro è strutturato nella manie­
ra seguente. La Sez. Í introduce in termini generali la personalità scientifica di 
Hayek e presenta le caratteristiche distintive del suo approccio ai problemi delle 
scienze sociali. La Sez. 2 tratteggia brevemente la vita e la carriera scientifica di 
Hayek. Nella Sez. 3, infine, vengono esaminate le ragioni teoriche che sottostan­
no ad un’importante cambiamento di rotta nell’attività scientifica di Hayek, verifi­
catosi nei primi anni quaranta: più precisamente, vengono spiegati i motivi per i 
quali Hayek, dopo aver dedicato vent’anni della sua vita allo sviluppo della 
teoria economica pura, decise ad un certo punto di ridurre in maniera significati­
va il suo impegno nel campo dell’economia strettamente intesa, e contestualmen­
te si propose di elaborare un nuovo approccio teorico, alternativo a quello carat­
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MEMORY IN DYNAMIC PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
by
T.V.S. R a m a m o h a n  R a o  *
1. Dynamics of Memory
Consider implicit contracts like the employment relation. Such con­
tracts involve an interaction between the workers as a group * 1 and the 
managers. They enter into a long term contract only if they (a) expect 
net gains from joint work; (b) have similar perceptions regarding the 
organizational goals, and (c) can reach an agreement with respect to the 
decision making process to achieve the net gains.
However, individuals would still have the freedom to pursue their 
personal goals, albeit within the limits placed on them by the contract 
specification. One of the constraints is usually the information (regarding 
the technology and/or the profits of the firm) which they can obtain given 
their position in the organizational echelons. Information asymmetry, which 
is a result of decentralized decision making in all such principal-agent con­
texts, can lead to shirking of work, resource diversions in the sense of 
Hoenack (1983), and other contract reneging possibilities. They have the 
effect of reducing the efficiency (expressed in terms of total net gains) of the 
organization. Most of the literature on the principal-agent problem empha­
sizes the design of organizational mechanisms which maximize the net re­
turn from their joint activity. See MacDonald (1984, p. 418) and Fitzroy
*  Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, U.P. (India).
I benefitted from the comments and suggestions of the referee. I would also like to draw 
the attention of the reader to the fact that most of the 1991 references which I am quoting 
here were not accessible to me when I completed writing the earlier version of the paper in 
March 1991. That the recent literature is emphasizing equity issues is a matter of coincidence. 
However, as far as I could calibrate, the results reported here have not been superseded.
For purposes of analytical simplicity it will be assumed that the workers are a 
homogeneous group and they collectively bargain with the managers.
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and Mueller (1984, p. 54). In general, the emphasis has been on the
efficiency of an enduring relationship.
Two other aspects of the principal-agent relationship are transparent
from the above description.
{a) Individuals are oriented towards the pursuit of self-interest and 
attempt to maximize their share of the total net gains. This can lead to an 
inequity in the distribution of net gains from joint work.
(b) The persistence of inequities may have the long run effect of 
disturbing efficient participation in the work process and/or destroying the 
possibility of the agency relationship lasting over time. This was explicitly 
noted in Bigman (1991, pp. 116 ff). Hence, as Radner (1991, p. 219) 
remarked, the specification of the dynamic principal-agent problem would 
be incomplete unless there is an explicit treatment of the rule for sharing the 
net gains from the agency relationship. That is, balancing the individual 
perceptions of equity and the overall efficiency of the organization would 
easily be the essence of the dynamic principal-agent relationship.
Notice that even when both the parties in exchange have full informa­
tion regarding the technological and market advantages of cooperation there 
is a need to define the procedures regarding the distribution of benefits to 
avoid reneging. The postulates of information asymmetry and the uncertain­
ty in the state of nature may enhance the descriptive realism of the princi­
pal-agent problem and make the designing of contractual mechanisms more 
intricate 2. But they are not fundamental to explaining the existence of 
equity problems which are intrinsic to all contractual organizations. Sur­
veying the various conceptual problems of game theory, Rubenstein (1991) 
suggested that preference should be given to those formulations in which 
there is a more explicit non-stochastic treatment of the nature, sources, and 
manifestations of such inequities.
The present study describes the viability of such contractual organiza­
tions in terms of (<z) the level of performance or organizational efficiency, 
and (b) the equity in the distribution of net gains from joint work.
Organizational problems of this nature are essentially dynamic. In 
particular, both the workers and the managers modify their behavior on the 
basis of the information which they accumulate over time regarding (a) the 
degree of cooperation that can be elicited, and {b) the fairness and equity in 
organizational decisions.
That is, cooperative attitudes at a point of time do not necessarily carry
2 Information asymmetry was introduced in a dynamic context in L a ffo n t  (1988), and 
B alachandran  and R o n en  (1989). But their emphasis is on the efficiency issue alone.
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over dynamically. An analysis of the implications of the equity issue for 
cooperative behavior within the framework of the dynamic principal-agent 
relationship is warranted 3. The present study examines the equity question 
and its implications for the efficiency of the dynamic principal-agent prob­
lem 4.
The specification of dynamic games is rather intricate and some of the 
details would be taken up in the next section. However, attention should be
J Six different points of view are available in the literature:
( a )  L e ib e n st e in  (1987) argued that cooperative behavior is an individualized idiosyncra- 
cy and must be ascertained at the stage of recruitment. In particular, the managers must make 
sure that the workers share the same organizational goals and accept the decision making 
process set up by the managers to achieve them. In such a case they can be assumed to accept 
the emerging distribution of gains as well. This procedure attempts to eliminate the possibility 
of organizational dissonance by assumption.
(b) F u d en berg  and T iro le  (1989, Section 3) pointed out that in the context of 
repeated games the information asymmetry can be eliminated over time. This may be sufficient 
to ensure an efficient equilibrium. However, as Gal-Or (1991, p. 284) pointed out, perfect 
information may make the principals and the agents more sensitive to observed inequities. 
Hence, perfect information does not guarantee the emergence of an equitable distribution of 
gains.
(c) Perforce, as Sen (1990, pp. 59 ff) suggested, individuals within the organization 
would be conditioned by a concern for the welfare of the other parties. For, after all, this is 
the essence of the agency relationship. However, it can at best be argued that such cooperative 
attitudes would be fairly strong. The possibility that differences in the perception regarding 
equitable distribution will persist cannot be ruled out.
(d) A recognition of the losses due to possible contract liquidation and renegotiation of 
a new contract may also act as a constraint on inequitable behavior. See, for instance, B est er  
(1989, p. 265). More generally this can be expressed in terms of reputation problems as in 
B ull (1983, pp. 659 ff). As he puts it, a reputation for breaking contracts will adversely affect 
the terms on which future bargaining will take place. The need to survive in the long run may 
therefore provide the principal an incentive to behave honorably.
(e) If more specific considerations of equity are essential much of the literature on 
organizational design suggests that incentives and monitoring mechanisms can foster cooperative 
behavior. See, for instance, M alcom son  and S pinnew yn  (1988). R iordan  (1984, p. 83) argued 
that lump sum transfers can always be offered. Or, as G a l-Or (1991, pp. 273 ff) put it, the 
payments to each of the parties can be defined in terms of (i) a payment based on the inputs 
provided by the individual, (ii) a portion of the output of the enterprise, and (Hi) a fixed sum, 
which may be considered as a share of profits. In essence, much of the current literature 
emphasizes the need to maximize the net gains and relegates equity issues to a secondary role.
(/) In the ultimate analysis, as A rrow  (1969, p. 62) puts it, “it is useful for individuals 
to have some trust in each other’s word. In the absence of trust it would be very costly to 
arrange for alternative sanctions and guarantees and many opportunities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation would have to be foregone”. All such adjustments may be operative up to a point.
4 Very few useful dynamic game models are available in the literature. For instance, refer 
to F eic h t in g e r  and J o r g en sen  (1983). The literature on dynamic principal-agent problems is 
even more recent. See R ao  (1992).
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directed to the specification of the memory of the agents and their goodwill 
towards the principals. In particular, notice that over time both the princi­
pals and the agents articulate their responses to a disequilibrium on the 
basis of the current information as well as their cumulative experiences over 
time (which can be characterized by utilizing the stock of goodwill concept). 
The viability of the long run relationship depends crucially on the extent to 
which the principals and/or the agents accommodate temporary contract 
violations based on the goodwill accumulated over time. This was noted in 
Benhabib and Ferri (1987), Carlton (1989, pp. 919-20), and Malcomson 
and Spinnewyn (1988). Memory and goodwill constitute one set of essential 
dynamic links in a principal-agent problem.
In general, there are four prominent sources of goodwill in a principal- 
agent relationship: (a) an equitable sharing of work and the net gains 
from cooperation; (b) benefits provided to the workers for their long term 
association 3; (c) investments in human capital formation in the form of 
upgradation of skills * 6 7, and (d) technological and/or organizational changes 
commensurate with the experience and perception of the workers .
To an extent the learning effects are firm specific and the fortunes of 
the workers will be related to growth within the firm. As a result, capital 
formation of the firm becomes another essential dynamic link from one 
period to the next. The analysis of equity issues should perforce be em­
bedded in a larger framework which takes capital formation within the firm 
into account.
The present study examines the role of each of these factors in bring­
ing about a cooperative equilibrium in the principal-agent context. The 
analysis is developed within the framework of a dynamic game 8 with an 
emphasis on the equity issues.
’ Collective worker’s welfare funds are in existence in Sweden and elsewhere. See, for
instance, K aitala  and P o h jo la  (1990, p. 435).
6 Most European countries have specific capital growth schemes and investments in 
human capital formation. This has been noted in K a itala  and Po h jo la  (1990), M alcom son  
and Spin n ew yn  (1988) and M ailath  and P o stlew a it e  (1990).
7 From an analytical viewpoint the inequities in the work related environment are of a 
different nature. The intra group relationships among the workers as well as the inter group 
relationships between the workers and the managers have been explicitly examined in R ao 
(1991). This aspect of the problem will not be pursued in this study.
8 The current literature on dynamic games is an inadequate basis for such an analysis. For, 
as F u d en berg  and T ir o le  (1989, Section 3) noted, there are three basic shortcomings:
(a) There is no direct link between the many time periods since there is no acknow­
ledgement of investment in productive machinery,
(b) the actions and payoffs at every point of time are assumed to be identical and 
known to both the principals and agents with certainty, and
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It has often been suggested that involving the workers in the man­
agement process to a larger extent may enable the managers to develop a 
rapport with the workers on a long term basis. Such a participation of the 
workers may also lead to a greater sense of equity in the distribution of 
gains among the workers. Consequently, it would be necessary to examine 
the nature of a cooperative equilibrium as well. However, it will be shown 
that the cooperative equilibrium would be superior only if there is sustained 
credibility of the intentions and actions of the principals in relation to the 
equitable distribution of gains.
The analysis of the present study suggests that the various incentive 
mechanisms available to the organization may make cooperative behavior 
enduring if it can be obtained in the first instance. However, any inference 
that cooperation will be a result of such organizational mechanisms appears 
to be indefensible.
2. Modelling Memory
Consider the case of a hierarchical firm wherein M  managers coordi­
nate the work of L production workers. Assume that K is the capital stock 
of the firm at any point of time /.T o  retain only the essential details of the 
algebra assume that
M = aK, and L =  bK
so that (b/a) represents the span of control within the organization. Denote 
the output of the firm, utilizing these resources, by
Y =  aK
where a, b, and a are assumed to be constants.
Let the market price of a unit of output be unity. Denote by w and m 
the wages paid per worker and the salary and perquisites to a manager 
respectively. Similarly, let a fraction S of output be set aside by the man­
agement towards a welfare fund or for human capital formation. It will be 
postulated that the surplus of revenue over costs is utilized for capital 
formation. That is,
dK/dt =  [a (1 — S) — ma — wb\ K  (1)
(c) subgame perfection is assumed in the sense that the game is expected to be played 
the same way at each point of time even if the player’s expectations are not fulfilled during 
the previous time period.
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Assume that the workers perceive ws to be the equitable wage rate 5 *9 10. 
It can be argued that w > ws as well as investments in welfare funds 
and/or human capital formation will add to the stock of goodwill 10,11 (G) 
at any point of time. Hence, it follows that
dG/dt — g{w  -  wf) K +  SaK (2)
It will be assumed that g and S are positive constants 12. In other words, the 
specification of G is one way of operationalizing memory in the dynamic 
principal-agent problems.
In general, the workers are expected to derive satisfaction from the 
total wage payments (wbK). In addition, the workers derive satisfaction 
from the stock of goodwill as well. The preference function of the agents 
can therefore be represented by
u — u (wbK, G); uv u2 > 0; un , u21 <  0 ; u12 <  0
where uj is the derivative of u with respect to wbK and similarly the other 
derivatives. In particular, it is being postulated that the workers are able to 
substitute G for w so that the marginal utility of wbK falls as G increases. 
This is reflected in the condition that ul2 <  0 .
Consider a situation in which the workers have full information re­
garding (a) the technology (in particular, the parameter b)\ (b) the salaries
5 As B igm an  (1991) suggested, ws may be related to the relative productivity of the
workers and the managers. For instance, ws = a/2b  will be one specification of the equitable
wage rate. But, as will be noted presently, the worker’s share in output may not be one half of
the total output generated. There is also a possibility of dynamic adjustments and adaptive 
expectations with respect to ws. The rest of the analysis and the qualitative implications remain
invariant if there is a stable value of ws in the long run steady state. Any other configuration 
will lead to further dynamic conflict between the principals and the agents.
10 If there is an investment in human capital formation the accumulated human capital 
will alter the value of a and also add to G. Since the additional algebraic difficulty does not 
alter the conclusions substantially this will not be pursued further.
11 In much of dynamic game theory the effect of memory is traced by utilizing the 
feedback control concepts. See, for instance, Shimomura (1991). In this approach, only the 
recently observed deviations of w from ws are taken into account. However, the introduction of 
a goodwill concept is more satisfactory from the viewpoint of economic theory for two reasons:
(a) the effects of w deviating from ws are cumulative and not just current and forgotten 
in subsequent time periods, and
(.b) the workers endeavor to bring about changes in w explicitly through an expression 
of their preferences rather than through some implicit valuation of such deviations.
12 It is possible to make an optimal choice of S rather than considering it as a parameter. 
However, this modification did not alter the qualitative nature of the results materially. Hence, 
only a few comparative static results will be reported.
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and perks (m) claimed by the managers, and (c) the managerial behavior 
towards capital formation.
Given m chosen by the managers, an increase in w has two effects:
(a) a reduction in K  which, along with the increase in w, changes the wage 
payments wbK, and (b) an increase in the stock of goodwill.
The optimal choice of w depends on the tradeoff of certain increases in 
utility at any point of time t for the sake of obtaining some future benefits.
In general, given the value of m, the workers can be expected to 
bargain for a specific time profile of wages with the managers so as to 
maximize
e~rt u (wbK, G) dt
o
subject to the differential equations (1) and (2 ), and suitable initial condi­
tions, where r is the discount rate.
By way of contrast, it should be noted that for a given value of w the 
managers choose m so as to maximize 13
f e rt v (maK, G) dt 
d o
where v (maK, G); vlt v2 >  0 ; vn , v22 <  0; v12 <  0 is the preference 
function of the managers. The rate of discount r is assumed to be the same 
for both the workers and the managers though it is not necessarily so.
The pertinent question for analysis is this: will this dynamic game with 
full information have a stable long run solution? 14 In order to answer this 
question consider the worker’s choice of w first. Construct the Hamiltonian
15 Information asymmetry between the principals and agents can take on many manifesta­
tions. In this study it is being postulated that the workers and the managers may not know 
each others objectives outside the cooperative equilibrium.
14 Three factors have been identified as essential for the stability of such dynamical 
systems. Firstly, it is essential that all the contingent claims are resolved to the satisfaction of 
both the principal and the agents. Secondly, whenever any of the parties is myopic and pursues 
its self interest it is necessary that its unilateral action has an insignificant effect on the 
evolution of the system. Thirdly, if there is a possibility of any one of them having a 
significant impact that party as well as the others must recognize that there will be instability 
and loss to everyone of the parties in exchange unless all of them exercise self restraint. 
Usually this feature is reflected in the degree of response to sources of instability implicit in 
the specification of the system dynamics. For a fairly detailed analysis of the issues involved 
see K arp (1992).
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H = e~rt u (wbK, G) +  A [a (1 -  5) -  ma -  wb] K  +
+ Iu[g(w -  ws) +  5a] K
where A and n can be interpreted as the discounted present values of the 
utility which the consumers derive from a unit of capital formation and 
accumulated goodwill respectively. Hence, H  is the instantaneous total utili­
ty, for the workers, of a specific choice of w given the value of m. By 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle, the optimal choice of w will satisfy the 
equations
dX/dt =  -  wbe~H Mj -  A [a (1 -  S) -  ma -  wb~\ -
-  H \g{w  -  ws) +  5a] 
d[i/dt =  -  e~rt «2 be~rt ul = Xb — ng
and the transversality conditions 15
lim XK =  0, lim /iG  - 0
/  —»  OO t—>oo
It follows that
H =  (u2/r ) e~rt
A =  £-[«(i-S)-ma]t _|_ e~rt (gws — Sa)/r{a (1 — 5) — r — ma}\
It can be readily verified that the transversality conditions are satisfied. 
Hence, the optimal w is such that
e-[a (l —5)—r] / _  e-mat _(_ « 2 {_g (a* — bws) + bSa}/bra*\ =  f(m , w) 
where a* =  a (1 -  5) -  r -  ma (3)
Given the assumption that uu  < 0 it is readily apparent that 
df/dm  <  0, and df/dw  <  0 .
Similarly, it can be verified that
df/dg > 0, and df/dS > 0 .
Hence, it follows that
w = w(m, g, 5); wx < 0 ; w2 > 0 ; wi >  0 . 1
11 For details see Seier st a d  and S y d sea ter  (1987, ch. 3, section 7).
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The result, indicating that the workers would accept a lower w as m 
increases, is counter-intuitive. It can be explained thus: as noted earlier, an 
increase in m has a tendency to increase A, or the marginal utility of capital 
formation, from the viewpoint of the workers. Hence, the workers can be 
expected to prefer a lower w so that they can obtain a larger utility from 
increases in K.
Suppose the managers tend to claim a larger m even when the workers 
exhibit this pattern of behavior. It can then be argued that the insensitivity 
of the managers becomes a potential source of conflict between the princi­
pals and the agents in the process of distribution of gains. This can now be 
examined in some detail.
The optimization problem of the managers is somewhat symmetric. 
Construct the Hamiltonian
H* =  e~rt v (maK, G) + <p [(a (1 -  8) -  ma -  wb] K  +
+  <Plg(w -  ws) +  5a] K
The optimal choice of m, for a given w, satisfies the equations 
d<p/dt = - m a  e~rt v1 -  <f> [a (1 -  8) -  ma -  wb] -  <f>[g(w -  ws) + 8a] 
d'i'/dt = -  e~rt v2 e- rt vx = <f>
and the transversality conditions
lim (¡)K =  0 , lim 0G  =  0
t —> O f   ̂OQ
Hence, it can be verified that
0  =  (v2/r) e~rt
0  =  e-[a(i-S)-wb]t _  [<g {w _  +  Sa]/f[a ( l _ § ) _ r _  wb]
so that the optimal m is given by the equation
6 [a<1 r]> = e wbt \vi +  v2 (w -  ws) +  8a}/r [a (1 -  8) -  r -  wb}]
=  h [m, w)
Since vl2 <  0 is postulated it follows that
dh/dm  <  0
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However, the sign of dh/dw  depends upon the value of w. Let wm be 
such that
vx [a (1 — 8) — r — wb] +  v2 [g (w -  ws) +  5a] =  0 
Then, it can be shown that
dh/dw > 0 whenever w <  wm 
and the sign changes otherwise.
The nature of the non-cooperative equilibrium can be examined by 
constructing the {m, w) loci implied by the choices of the workers and the 
management. In particular, along the optimal trajectory specified by the 
workers dm/dw >  0 whereas the locus representing the choice of the 
managers has a »-shape with the minimim occurring at wm. It can now be 
verified that the non-cooperative equilibrium is stable only if the locus of /  
is steeper than the h locus. This is represented in Fig. 1.
W W
(a) (b) (O
F ig . 1
Fundamentally the differences arise as a result of the differential valua­
tion of goodwill by the managers and the workers. In particular, a stable 
equilibrium is possible only if v2 >  u2. This, in its turn, implies that for a 
given reduction in the value of m, the worker’s demand for an increase in w 
should be less than the increase which the managers are willing to concede. 
Some cooperation is essential to obtain conflict resolution when the system 
is away from equilibrium.
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To appreciate the effect of the welfare fund and memory on the nature 
of the equilibrium put g =  0 =  S in equations (3) and (4). It can be readily 
verified that
(a) the workers are never better off in the unstable case and the con­
flict between the workers and the managers persists,
(b) in the context of a stable equilibrium the workers will benefit only 
when the manager’s marginal valuation of the goodwill generated exceeds 
that of the workers (see Fig. 2), and
(c) the goodwill generated by an increase in w and/or g always has a 
more favorable impact on the equilibrium in comparison to changes in S 
primarily because an increase in w has both a direct effect through the 
valuation of wage incomes and an indirect effect through the valuation of 
goodwill.
In essence it can be claimed that organizational mechanisms which 
approach the question of equitable distribution directly are superior to indi­
rect measures like the welfare fund or investments in firm specific human 
capital.
3. Cooperative Equilibrium
It has been pointed out in dynamic game theory with perfect informa­
tion that there is a tendency on the part of the principals and agents to move
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towards a cooperative solution 16. It would be useful to examine the relation­
ship between the equilibrium obtained in the previous section and the 
cooperative solution.
A cooperative game is a full information specification where the princi­
pal and agent get together and maximize their collective gain. That is, the 
workers and the managers agree to choose w and m so as to maximize
✓» oo
e~rt [u [wbK) +  v (maK)] dt (5)
V o
subject to equations (1) and (2 ) and suitable initial conditions.
To solve this problem, construct the Hamiltonian
H  =  e~rt \u (wbK) +  v (maK)\ +  & [a (1 — 5) — ma — wb\ K +
+ £[g(w  -  ws) +  5a] K
The optimal choices of w and m satisfy the equations 
d&/dt =  — e~rt (wbu1 +  mavx) — @ [a (1 — S) — ma — wb\ —
-  E [ g { w  -  ws) +  5a]
de/dt =  — e~rt (u2 + v2) 
b e~rt u1 -  Ob +  Eg =  0, and e~rt vv =  & 
along with the transversality conditions
lim 0K  =  0, and lim eG =  0
From these equations it can be readily verified that
£ =  [(«2 +  v2)/r] e~rt
16 There is no unique specification of the concept of cooperation in the context of 
dynamic game theory. In one version, following G radus (1988, 1989), the existence of 
cooperation is interpreted as the emergence of a single preference function with equal weights 
assigned to the preferences of each of the parties. The alternative is to define it as a situation 
in which the simultaneous choice of the decisions of both the parties leads to a Pareto optimal 
solution in which neither of the parties can be made better off without making the other 
worse off. However, the notion of simultaneity remains ambiguous. The only justifiable proced­
ure may be to say that both the parties can influence the decisions of the other. It will be clear 
from the rest of the analysis that this approach is operationally inadequate. In general, it is 
difficult to a priori assess (a) which of the solution concepts is superior in a specific 
organizational context, and (b) the requirements for implementing a desirable solution.
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& =  e “ (i S)t + e rl t(a2 +  fl2) (¿ws ~ Sa)/r{a  (1 -  8) -  r}] 
so that the w and m choices are simultaneously determined by the equations
b e~[a = buy +  (u2 + v2) \_g{a — 8) — r bws} +
+  bSa]/r[a (1 — S) — r] 
==, /  (fn, w) (6 )
b ¿.-t“ d-5)-r]/ — y [Vi — {(u2 +  v2) (gws — 8a)}/m  {(1 — 8) — r}]
=  h (m, w) (7)
It can be shown that
df/dm  <  0 , df/dw < 0
dh/dw  <  0 , dh/dm  < 0  if m <  mc and >  0 otherwise,
where mc satisfies the equation
vn r{a (l -  8) -  r] -  vu  (gws -  8a) =  0 .
Consider Fig. 3 where the loci of /  and h are represented by f c and hc. 
It can be shown, as in the previous section, that the cooperative equilibrium 
is stable if the f c locus is steeper than that of hc. A comparison of this 
solution with the non-cooperative equilibrium can be obtained by comparing
F ig . 3
4 4 T.V.S. RAMAMOHAN RAO
equations (3) and (4) with (6 ) and (7) respectively. The loci f„ and h„ 
correspond to the non-cooperative solution. Front this it can be inferred that 
the cooperative equilibrium is superior only if h shifts more than the f  
does 17. That is, the managers should indicate that they value cooperation 
and goodwill much more than the workers do. A stable equilibrium, in 
which both the principals and the agents gain, may then emerge. However, 
there will be a conflict and instability of the cooperative equilibrium if they 
do not react adequately.
The non-cooperative equilibrium does not generally coincide with the 
cooperative equilibrium. The possibility of obtaining positive long run wel­
fare gains from cooperation, social investments, and long term participation 
in management depends on the attitudes of both the groups.
4. General Observations
A dynamic specification of fairness and equity must take into account 
the distribution of gains at a point of time as well as the accumulated 
goodwill. It was shown that a basic cooperative attitude and formulation of 
dynamically sustainable contingent claims contracts would be necessary to 
ensure organizational viability in such a context. Incentives in the form of a 
welfare fund or firm specific human capital formation can reinforce coopera­
tive behavior if it can be obtained in the first instance but cannot be 
expected to generate it otherwise.
Note that the efficiency aspect of the organizational structure could not 
be integrated into the formulation of the dynamic principal-agent problem 
which emphasizes the equity issues. An explicit consideration of the efficien­
cy-equity tradeoff should constitute an integral part of the organizational 
design. A more realistic formulation would undoubtedly necessitate a de­
tailed specification of the dynamic principal-agent problem as well as basic 
refinements in the solution concepts in the context of dynamic game theory.
17 The referee pointed out that maximization of (5) implies that the value of the integral 
must be greater than that obtained in non-cooperative equilibrium in the previous section. If 
so, this statement would look like a contradiction. However, the total may still be distributed 
unequally and one of the parties may find itself in an inferior state. Hence, the cooperative 
equilibrium can be considered to be superior if and only if (a) the total is larger, and (b) both 
the principal and agent receive at least what they have been able to achieve in the non-coopera­
tive equilibrium.
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LA MEMORIA IN PROBLEMI DINAMICI PRINCIPALE-AGENTE
Q u esto  studio d im ostra che la m em oria e la buona d isposizione risultanti 
dalla  percezione dell’equità  nella d istribuzione dei guadagn i e dalla form azione 
del capitale um ano specifico  dell’im presa, p ossono rendere durevole il com por­
tam ento cooperativo in un problem a dinam ico principale-agente. T u ttav ia , questi 
m eccanism i organizzativi non possono generare cooperazione se i principali e /o  
agenti non vi sono già  inclini.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 1, 47-62
EXPLAINING CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION 
IN NATIONALIZATION FREQUENCIES
by
Thomas Andersson * and Kurt Brannas * *
I. Introduction
In contrast to portfolio investment, direct investment remains under 
the control of foreign investors. It is well-known that the risk of nationaliza­
tion by host countries may prevent it from being undertaken.
Various studies have examined the occurrence of nationalizations a- 
cross countries. Jodice (1980) explained some 60% of the variation in 
natural resource nationalizations 1968-1976. He argued that nationalization 
occurs because weak regimes capable of running firms under domestic own­
ership (due to high GDP and satisfactory government capacity) need scape­
goats in times of crisis. Shafer (1985) related the costs of nationalization to 
the strength, resources and autonomy of a state. According to Burton and 
Inoue (1984), the sectorial pattern similarly reflects a country’s economic 
development. Juhl (1985) supported the view that nationalization increases 
with a country’s capacity to assume responsibility for affiliates. None of 
these studies are compatible with the abrupt downturn which occurred in 
nationalizations after 1976, however. It can be noted that this downturn 
occurred in all sectors, while many of the previous studies have been con­
cerned only with individual ones. In fact, there has been no satisfactory 
explanation of when in time nationalizations are undertaken.
In this study, we examine the cross-country variation in the frequency 
of nationalizations across all sectors during the period 1968-1979. The 
frequency measures the time during which countries have pursued nationali-
*  The Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research (IUI) Stockholm, Sweden.
* *  Department of Economics, University of Umea (Sweden).
Financial support from Swedish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences 
is gratefully acknowledged.
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zations. Special consideration is given to the costs of discouraging direct 
investment to other host countries which compete for direct investment. 
Such costs may explain why it has not been possible to explain the occurren­
ce of nationalizations solely by looking at the characteristics of individual 
countries. Examining them, we argue that there are two phenomena to take 
into account, a clustering in countries’ behaviour and/or dependence in 
nationalizations over time. The empirical examination raises intricate econo­
metric problems, however. First, the annual occurrence of nationalizations is 
a dichotomous variable from which the frequency variable is aggregated. 
Second, the explanatory variables are not directly or annually observable. 
Third, we expect an interdependence in the behaviour of countries that are 
close substitutes for direct investment, but this heterogeneity cannot be 
directly observed.
To deal with these difficulties, this article firstly develops a binomial 
regression model. A semiparametric estimator identifies a possible unob­
served heterogeneity which may indicate clustered country behaviour. 
Secondly, a Markovian model takes account of the dependence between 
countries’ successive nationalizations. The model enables estimation of the 
expected frequency of individual countries. This approach allows us to 
study the latent dynamics underlying the observed frequencies.
Section 2 presents hypotheses and variables for empirical testing. Sec­
tion 3 discusses the data base. The econometric count data model and its 
semi-parametric estimation are introduced in Section 4. In addition, the 
expected number of years of nationalizations is obtained from a dynamic 
first order Markov chain. Nonlinear least squares estimation is demonstrated 
to be feasible. Section 5 presents the empirical results and analyses marginal 
effects. The article is summarized in Section 6 . I.
II. Hypotheses and Variables
Direct investment is ‘traded’ in a market where it is supplied by firms 
and demanded by host countries. Taxation and nationalization are alterna­
tive measures for host countries to appropriate gains once investments have 
taken place. The greater the profits that cannot be taxed, but can be re­
tained under domestic ownership, and the greater the host country’s need of 
earning foreign exchange in the short run, the greater the benefits of nationa­
lization. The losses, on the other hand, are primarily of a long-run nature. 
Nationalization cuts off a subsidiary from its parent company, and the 
probable outcome is a gradual loss of capital, technology, employment op-
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portunities, possible risk-diversification, etc. In addition, future direct in­
vestment may be discouraged.
In a world of incomplete information, countries’ past behaviour is 
likely to influence the estimated risk of future nationalizations through a 
signalling effect. A country which nationalizes may inflict a damage to its 
reputation, and discourage direct investment in the future (Eaton and Gerso- 
vitz, 1984). Since the late 1970s countries have nationalized foreign firms 
selectively, however. Investments are discouraged only if the risk of nationa­
lization for the individual firm outweighs the expected profits. The greater 
the stock of investment in a country, or the greater the amount of in­
vestment which may be attracted by a country, the greater the potential loss 
from nationalization in the form of foregone investment. In addition, the 
amount of investment discouraged by nationalization hinges on what alterna­
tive opportunities are available for firms. This, in turn, is influenced by 
what behaviour is expected by other potential host countries that may serve 
as alternative locations for a project. As discussed in Andersson (1991) this 
may give rise to an interdependency in the behaviour of countries. The 
greater the number of competing countries that nationalize, the smaller the 
discouraging effect on the flow of direct investment for an individual coun­
try that nationalizes, and the smaller the captured rent necessary to make 
nationalization pay. The fewer competing countries that nationalize, the 
larger the discouraging effect and the larger the captured rent required for 
nationalization to pay.
In this situation, it is far from straightforward how to represent the 
costs of discouraging direct investment through nationalizations. However, 
one should expect a clustering-grouping in countries’ behaviour. The 
problem is that we can not observe which countries are close substitutes as 
location for direct investment and we do not know in advance how many 
groups to look for. Moreover, it is likely to take time before a reputation 
can be revived. A country can be expected to discourage more direct in­
vestment when it starts nationalizing than when it continues to do so. This 
creates a dependence in a country’s successive nationalizations in time.
Below, we analyse the occurrence of nationalizations across countries 
as well as over time in 1968-1979. This period includes the historical peak 
of the policy, as well as its beginning downturn after 1976. The number of 
years 1968-1979 in which a country nationalized is the dependent variable. 
This number, termed the frequency of nationalization, is discrete and ranges 
from 0 to maximally 12. For estimation, we will apply both a binomial 
regression and a regression based on a Markov chain.
In practice, it is not possible to directly observe the profitability of
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nationalization relative to taxation or the discouragement of direct in­
vestment 1. Instead, we examine factors that can be expected to be asso­
ciated with the relative profitability. Influences which are associated with 
the benefits, i.e. the profitability of nationalization relative to taxation, 
should not be affected by the dependency over time. Influences associated 
with the costs of discouraging direct investment should, however. Some 
variables are related both to the benefits of taxation and to the discour­
agement of investment. The implications for nationalization may, as seen 
below, go different ways. The definitions of explanatory variables and 
descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The rationale for their inclusion is 
as follows for each variable:
xp The stock o f direct investment measures both the amount of 
investment which is available for nationalization, and that which may be 
discouraged by it. There should be either a positive or a negative impact on 
nationalization, depending on which effect is stronger.
x2: The growth rate is positively related to a country's ability to 
attract new investment. A negative impact on nationalization is expected for 
two reasons. The higher the rate of growth the better the prospects for tax 
revenue by the host country, and the greater the amount of investment 
which risks to be discouraged by nationalization.
xy. The size o f the economy (GDP) is a proxy variable for the degree 
of capital mobility between an economy and the rest of the world. With a 
larger economy, investment is less easily discouraged by nationalization. 
Thus, we expect a positive impact on nationalization to the extent that the 
disincentive effect is important1 2.
x4: The income level (GDP/c) has previously been viewed as an 
indicator of a country’s capacity to run nationalized firms under domestic 
ownership, which suggests a positive impact. However, the income level 
also reflects a country’s ability to gain from direct investment under foreign 
ownership, which may account for a negative impact. Moreover, GDP/c is 
positively related to the capacity to attract new investment, and thereby the 
discouraging effect. This suggests a negative impact if the discouraging 
effect is strong.
Xy The export commodity concentration indicates the vulnerability of
1 Among the studies that have failed to verify effects of nationalization on the flow of 
direct investment G r e en  (1972) and T h u n ell  (1977) can be mentioned.
2 An alternative would have been to use some proxy for openness, such as the prevalence 
of trade distortions. For the many developing countries studied here there are no satisfactory 
estimates of openness, however. For the usefulness of GDP in this context, see H uizinga  
(1988).
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a country’s external position and the need of short-term foreign exchange 
earnings. A positive impact is expected. A dummy variable is created taking 
the value 1 if the share of fuels, minerals and metals in total merchandise 
exports exceeded 80% in 1970 or 1980, otherwise zero. The dummy re­
flects that a high concentration is likely to exert an impact, while variation 
at a low level should not matter.
x6: The tax rate is negatively related to the benefits of nationaliza­
tion. As we cannot observe the specific tax levied on foreign firms, we use 
the average tax pressure in the economy as a proxy.
III. Data
It is difficult to obtain consistent data on nationalizations, i.e. involun­
tary seizure of equity. Rather than developing a new data base we use the 
most comprehensive one available, based on a systematic scanning of secon­
dary sources by Kobrin (1980). The unit of analysis is an act which is 
defined as the taking of any number of firms in a single industry in a single 
country in a given year. It is questionable to quantify nationalizations on the 
basis of the number of acts or firms taken, since the seriousness of “of­
fenses” varies. This “seriousness” is affected by tacit compensation which 
cannot be observed. However, the data allows us to register whether 
nationalizations occur or do not occur at a given point in time.
Our sample includes 67 observations, which are all developing coun­
tries with a stock of direct investment that amounts to at least 60 million 
USD on average 1972-1974, according to UNCTC (1983). Eleven countries 
with missing values had to be excluded, reducing the number of observa­
tions to 56. The lower limit is used to avoid inclusion of countries where 
nationalization was ruled out due to a lack of targets. All together the 
countries excluded were hosts for less than 2 % of the total stock of direct 
investment in developing countries 3. A list of the included countries is 
found in Table 3.
Definitions and descriptive measures for the explanatory variables are 
given in Table 1. The measures relate either at an average level, to a change 
during the sample period or, for variables that have been at a fairly constant
The following countries nationalized but were excluded because of a small stock; 
Antigua, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodja, Laos, Nepal, Benin, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Somalia, Uganda, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, Lebanon, 
Oman, Quatar, Syria and Yemen. Other 22 countries did not have the required stock and did 
not nationalize.
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T a ble  1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (ft =  56)
Variable Definition Mean Median Standard
Deviation
* i Direct Investment 
(Stock, 1974)
857 345 1445









X , Export Commodity Concentration 
(Low/High)
.21 0 .41
x 6 Tax Rate
(Per Cent of GDP)
16.7 16.3 6.5
y Frequency 2.5 2.0 2.1
level, to individual years. The reason is that usage of annual observations 
on explanatory variables would exclude many countries for which data 
could not be found. Moreover, it would require a specification of how firms 
and countries form expectations of each other’s behaviour. This is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but has been addressed in Andersson and Brannas 
(1990).
IV. Models and Estimation
In this section we introduce the binomial and Markov models as well 
as the applied estimators. The former model is based on the assumption that 
a country’s nationalizations are independent over time, while allowing for 
clustering of countries’ behaviour. The latter model is based on a first order 
Markov chain, which takes account of the possible dependence over time in 
the policy of each country. IV.
IV. 1. Binomial Model. — Assume that nationalization in each year is a 
Bernoulli distributed random variable. Given independence between years, 
the resulting variable, the number of years of nationalization out of 12 
possible, is binomially distributed. A binomial regression model sets the 
probability of nationalization p equal to a distribution function, guarantee-
CROSS-COUNTRY VARIATION IN NATIONALIZATION FREQUENCIES 5 3
ing that the estimated probability remains in the permissable range. With a 
logistic distribution function, the Bernoulli probabilities of nationalization 
each year form a logit model. The probability of nationalization for the ith. 
country (i — 1, ..., N) is pt =  1/(1 +  exp ixfi)), where x  is the k -vector 
of explanatory variables, and /? is the vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated.
It turns out that the variance of the number of years of nationaliza­
tion is larger than the mean (cf. Table 1), while it is expected to be smaller 
with the binomial distribution. This means that there is “overdispersion”, 
or unobserved heterogeneity, which should be taken into account. It can 
arise due to, e.g., omitted, proxy or error contaminated variables, or random 
parameters (e.g., Brannas and Rosenqvist, 1992). Treating the unobserved 
heterogeneity as a random variable 0 (with an unknown distribution func­
tion) we write the probability for a given 0 as p ■ =  1/(1 +  exp {xfi +  9)).
Dunn et al. (1987) suggest a semiparametric estimator to a related 
type of model. The unknown parameter vector /? and the shape of the 
unknown continuous distribution function are estimated jointly. The latter 
is estimated by a discrete distribution function. The points of increase are 
mass points (¿7) and the increments (<jy) are probabilities corresponding to 
each mass point. The model is estimated without a constant term so that 
the mass points can be interpreted as constant terms. It is possible to predict 
which constant term is the most likely one for each country by logistic 
discrimination, see below. From general theory it is known that the number 
of mass points (Q) is finite (Simar, 1976; Lindsay, 1983). Empirical 
experience with this estimation procedure suggests that Q usually is quite 
small.
The density function to be used for estimation is for the ith country 
written in the form of a finite mixture model with logistic probabilities 
Pr (y, ) =  E f =  | q j  Pr (yj0;). Hefe, y t is the frequency of nationalization 
and Pr {y\6-) is the conditional binomial density function.
The log-likelihood function,
(1 +  V 2
( 1 )
where l t] — exp ( x f i  + 0-), is maximized with respect to /?, the probabil­
ities qp the mass points 0-, and the number Q.
To estimate Q we use a theoretically motivated criterion function due 
to, e.g., Lindsay (1983). This function D (0) =  E ^= { {Pr (yl\8)/Pr (y()} -  N  
is evaluated for all 0 6 5 . Here, the denominator is evaluated at estimates 
ft 0; , qj and Pr (y,\0) at (i. Lindsay (1983) provides conditions on the
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range and potential gaps of S . The estimates (ft', O', q , Q) that maximize 
the likelihood function globally have the property that D (Oft =  0 and D (0) 
<  0 for other values of 0. It can be noted that neglect of unobserved 
random heterogeneity, when such prevails, generally leads to an inconsistent 
estimator. The D (0) function can be seen as one means of testing the 
model specification for unobserved random heterogeneity 4.
The log-likelihood function (1) is maximized (routine AMOEBA, 
Press et ah, 1986). With Q treated as fixed, the covariance matrix is 
calculated using the Berndt et al. (1974) algorithm. To estimate the value of 
Q and to ascertain that the obtained solution is indeed a global maximum, 
the D (0) function is evaluated.
The probability that a given country is associated with a particular 
mass point or constant term j  (j =  1, ..., Q) is obtained by the Bayes rule 
as dj =  Pr (j|y;) =  q- Pr (yft)/Pr (yft. The dj is a logistic discrimination 
probability.
IV.2. Markov Model. — Given that nationalizations cause reputation effects, 
which gradually diminish over time, the occurrence of the policy should not 
be independently distributed. For variables related to the benefits of nationa­
lization, this should not pose any problem. The disincentive effects, related 
to the costs of discouraging future investment, may not be properly captured 
unless the dependence over time is taken into consideration, however. To 
account for dependence in a country’s nationalization decisions over time we 
assume that the dynamics arises as a first order Markov chain. As will be 
demonstrated below, this is a natural extension to the binomial model.
Again, there are two states: nationalize (state 1) and not nationalize 
(state 0). The probability vector pt has two corresponding elements p lt and 
p0l. By the Markov property (e.g., Bhat, 1972, ch. 3) the probability of the 
present state vector depends only on the state vector in the previous period. 
Collecting the conditional probabilities into a transition matrix we obtain
n Pl  0 P 10
-  Pl  1 P n
Here, p l0 is the conditional probability of a transition to state 0 given that
4 B rannas and Ro sen q v ist  (1992) provide examples of the use of the criterion function 
in count data models. B rannas (1992) presents Monte Carlo evidence that this informal test 
has an actual size far above the nominal one.
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state 1 was occupied in the previous period and p n for a transition to state
1. We may write p, =  pt_ l P. It follows from the time invariant P that 
Pi = PoPr As / —> °° there will be a steady state probability vector n' =  (Tr0, 
7tj) under certain conditions on P.
The initial state is taken to be the first available year, i.e. 1968. We 
observe the total number of visits to state 1. Under the Markov assumption 
the expected number of visits in the nationalization state in the remaining 
11 years (cf. Bhat, 1972, ch. 3) is
H(22) = ____ 1 ̂ 10_____ (1 ~ Pn) (Pn ~ P iq) [1 ~ (Pn ~  P iq)11] ^
1 +  Pio ~ Pn ( 1  +  Pio ~  Pn)2
A related expression ^¿¡n is available for the initial state 0.
Note that in the binomial regression based on independence over 
time the probability of nationalization is constant and takes the logit form 
1/(1 +  exp (%/?)). Let this correspond to the steady state probability 7tj. 
We have
P io____ __ 1
1 -  Pn +  Pio 1 +  ^
(3)
and nQ — 1 tcv Using this relation between n-y and the transition proba­
bilities, the expected frequency in (2 ) can be rephrased in terms of logit 
probabilities. This makes it possible to estimate the impact of explanatory 
variables when dependence between years is taken into account. After 
some algebraic manipulation of (2 ) and /Iq\1\  the expected frequency (for 
given initial state z0 =  1 when a country nationalized in 1968, and z0 =  0 
otherwise) is given as
(1 1  + l — f l
a-
( l  n i) Pio
zJLq ( i _ Pm 1 Pi o (4)
This expression can be used for nonlinear least squares estimation 
of ft and pyq, which is assumed to be constant 5 6. ĴĈe may estimate an 
individual p n i as 1 +  j>10 — p w/fcu by solving (3 ).
’ A Markov chain in steady state has /^V ' =  4 * ,»  =  lltr ,. This corresponds to the 
expected frequency of nationalization for the binomial distribution Bin (11, zr,). The expected
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V. Results
The parameter estimates for both model types are presented in Table
2. For the binomial model, the proposed estimation procedure indicates 
that Q =  2 is the appropriate number of mass points, see below. A 
negative parameter estimate implies that the corresponding variable has *6
T able 2
ESTIMATION RESULTS AND ELASTICITIES 




0  =  2 Elasticities
In x 1 -.451 .31 -.170
(1.89) (1.18)
x 2 .181 -.56 .102
(2.23) (1.92)
In Xj .031 -.02 -.098
(.16) (.78)
In x4 .349 -.24 .191
(1.18) (1.47)
*5 -.916 — -.497
(1.93) (1.63)
*6 .065 -.75 .001
(1.48) (.27)
h .416 .911
d2 -  1.514 —
<71 .804 1
4 2/P io .196 .082
e /R 2 -  315.4 .23
number of years of nationalization in the overdispersed binomial logit model is, using a second 
order Taylor expansion of 1/(1 +  exp (x/J +  6)) around E (8) =  0, given by E (y) =
(12 +  (JjjKq (7tq — Jt;)). The leading term corresponds to the expected frequency under a 
Markov assumption but higher order terms differ. The variance of the overdispersed binomial 
model is, to first order, V (y) =  12 ^  (1 -  7rx)[l +  (1 -  Tip],
6 In estimating the nonlinear regression model the heteroskedasticity of the random 
error term 6 , =  y t — ¡1 , may influence the standard errors of parameter estimators. A 
heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator is available. Let y' =  (/?', p l0) denote 
the parameter vector, then Cov ( f)  =  F ~ l JF~ l, where general F and /  expressions are given 
by G allant (1987, ch. 2). In the absence of heteroskedasticity the covariance matrix reduces 
to F~K
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a positive impact on the probability of nationalization. The table also 
includes elasticities on the probability of nationalization, or on the expected 
number of years of nationalization, for the binomial model.
The D (0) function is shown in Figure 1. Two (Q =  2) mass points 
are enough to produce a global maximum of the likelihood function. The 
two mass points, at 9j =  0.4 and 02 =  -  1.5, correspond to a low and a 
high probability to nationalize respectively. Both the parameter estimates 
and the associated standard errors are mostly greater for the greater Q  value.
50 -| D^ )
40 - 
30 - 
20 -  
10 -
0 - , -  .
-10 - / " "  ' ^ Q =2
-20 J i-----i— —i------r — i i i
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
e
Fig . 1. The D (0) functions (Q =  2) for the mixed binomial.
Generally, the parameter estimates for the Markov model are smaller 
in absolute size than for the binomial model. The conditional probability 
p  10 of exiting the nationalization state given nationalization in the previous 
period is not large but significantly different from zero. It follows that 
there is a large probability (1 -  p w) of staying in the no nationalization 
state once it is entered. The reported /-values for the Markov model are 
based on the F matrix (see footnote 6) and are underestimated. It should be 
noted that the conditioning number of F is only 0.005, indicating an almost 
singular F. Adding a small constant to the diagonal elements of F increases 
substantially the conditioning number and the /-values.
In the binomial regression, we expected to capture effects associated 
with the benefits of nationalization. The stock of direct investment (xj), the 
growth rate (x2), the export concentration (x5), and the tax rate (x6) all 
exerted the effects expected on this basis. Considering the one-sidedness of 
some of the hypotheses, x2 and x5 are significant at the 5% level, the other 
two at the 10%-level. The income level (x4) did not exert any significant
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impact, giving no evidence that countries’ ability to obtain gains under 
foreign relative to domestic ownership at varying income levels played a 
role.
Taking the dependency over years into consideration, we expect the 
Markov model to capture discouraging effects of nationalization on direct 
investment. As the /-values in the Markov model are known to be under­
estimated, we compare the outcome of the two tests although no impacts 
are seemingly significant at the 5% -level in the latter model. For x2, x5 
and x6 the Markov model test gave the same results as the binomial 
regression, except that x6 ceased to be significant. This is natural since we 
did not expect any association with the disincentive effect for these varia­
bles. For x lt there should now be a negative influence counteracting the 
positive effect obtained in the binomial regression. The variable ceases to 
exert a significant influence in the Markov case, but the sign remains posi­
tive. We cannot rule out that this is due to the underestimation of the 
/-values in the Markov model tests. Flowever, both the size of the economy 
(x3) and the income level (x4) now render impacts with larger /-values than 
in the binomial model tests, and with the signs expected from the disincen­
tive effect on direct investment. The comparison between the binomial 
and Markov estimations consequently indicates that discouraging effects of 
nationalization are playing a role. The policy then becomes more probable 
the less direct investment is discouraged from a country due to nationali­
zation.
Let us take a closer look at the grouping of the individual countries 
included in the test. The calculated logistic discrimination probabilities 
(d) for the constant that produces the largest probability ( -  1.514 with 
probability 0.196) are displayed in the second column of Table 3. As can be 
seen, it is mainly countries with a high frequency of nationalizations which 
have a high probability for this constant. Column three reports the predic­
tions based on that constant term which is most likely for each country. 
This yields a highly satisfactory goodness of fit (x2 (46) =  33.4).
It is plausible that the clustering of countries around different mass 
points is due to their position vis-à-vis other developing countries with 
which they compete for direct investment, and the behaviour of those coun­
tries. As can be seen, there is an overrepresentation in the northern part of 
Latin America and in Central Africa, of small countries with high probabili­
ties for the larger constant. A possible interpretation is that they nationa­
lized more than motivated by their record in the dependent variables due to 
their clustered geographical locations. This would mean a small discourag­
ing effect of nationalization on direct investment. Countries like Algeria,
T a ble  3
COUNTRYWISE NATIONALIZATION FREQUENCIES (v), 1968-1979 
along with the predicted logistic discrimination probability (d) 
for the larger constant term 82 and the predicted frequency (y) 
based on the more probable constant term (breakpoint d  =  0.5)
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Country y d y Country y d y
Brazil 0 0.00 1.46 Mexico 4 0.20 1.86
Dom. Rep. 1 0.03 1.40 Gabon 2 0.00 2.68
El Salvador 1 0.01 1.19 Senegai 1 0.00 1.55
Indonesia 1 0.00 1.33 Guatemala 2 0.05 1.15
Malaysia 1 0.04 0.73 Colombia 3 0.04 1.78
Thailand 1 0.02 1.19 Costa Rica 5 0.99 3.53
Singapore 0 0.02 0.47 Perù 8 0.99 7.69
Papua 0 0.00 2.54 Panama 2 0.01 1.56
Paraguay 0 0.03 0.36 Venezuela 2 0.00 3.08
Uruguay 0 0.02 0.52 Bangladesh 3 0.02 2.07
Cameroon 0 0.00 1.08 India 4 0.00 4.39
Malawi 3 0.37 1.03 Kenya 3 0.39 1.01
Sierra Leone 1 0.00 1.59 Zaire 5 0.00 6.52
Togo 1 0.09 0.54 Zambia 7 0.89 7.95
Egypt 0 0.10 0.13 Marocco 4 0.93 3.79
Oman 1 0.01 1.21 Honduras 2 0.01 1.59
Tunisia 0 0.04 0.35 Pakistan 2 0.00 2.26
Turkey 0 0.00 0.86 Sri Lanka 4 0.87 4.35
Ivory Coast 0 0.01 0.65 Congo 6 0.99 4.82
Barbados 0 0.04 0.42 Ghana 5 0.00 4.40
South Korea 0 0.01 0.60 Nigeria 5 0.01 4.28
Nicaragua 1 0.00 1.78 Equador 6 0.99 5.07
Bolivia 3 0.01 2.26 Guyana 3 0.86 2.72
Haiti 2 0.01 1.64 Jamaica 4 0.01 2.90
Philippines 2 0.00 1.89 Tr & Tob 6 0.99 5.26
Chile 4 0.02 2.84 Kuwait 3 0.00 3.16
Iran 3 0.00 3.34 Tanzania 4 0.88 4.24
Argentina 5 0.05 3.15 Ethiopia 2 0.00 2.09
Iraq, and Trinidad and Tobago also nationalized as part of “global waves” 
within the petroleum industry. VI.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled the cross-country variation in nationali­
zation over time. The studied period is 1968-1979, which constitutes the
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peak period of the policy, as well as the decline in the late 1970s. The 
encountered econometric problems resulted in the application of two model 
types appropriate for the posed questions and the characteristics of the data. 
Estimation on the basis of a binomial model verifies that variables asso­
ciated with the benefits of nationalizations exerted significant impacts on 
the frequency of the policy. A larger stock of direct investment, slower 
growth, higher export commodity concentration and lower taxes had a 
discouraging effect on nationalizations.
Further, we have recorded a general clustering of countries in the 
binomial model test, with the constant term varying over sub-sets of coun­
tries. The existence of such sub-sets speaks for omitted variables, or for 
different structural relationships among groups of countries. This is in line 
with our notion that countries’ behaviour is influenced by that of others 
with which they compete for direct investment. The implication is that there 
may be large marginal effects if countries are shifted from one sub-set to 
another. Considering dependency on nationalizations over time through a 
Markov model, we also found that variables associated with the discourag­
ing effects on direct investment behave in line with our expectations. The 
/-values were underestimated due to collinearity problems. Still, it was veri­
fied that a country nationalizes less the higher the income level. Previous 
studies, confined to certain sectors and time periods, have argued the oppo­
site. Our framework provides a more general explanation for the variation 
in nationalization over time across more or less all sectors.
The above results call for further studying of the interdependency in 
host country behaviour through the testing of shifts in structural relation­
ships. Andersson and Brànnàs (1991) analyse the termination of nationaliza­
tion, while Andersson and Brànnàs (1990) use panel data to study how the 
impact of host country behaviour vis-à-vis direct investment changes over 
time. The findings of these studies are in line with those recorded here.
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6 2 THOMAS ANDERSSON an d  KURT BRÄNNÄS
SPIEGAZIONE DELLA VARIABILITÀ FRA PAESI DELLE FREQUENZE 
DI NAZIONALIZZAZIONE
Questo articolo esamina la frequenza delle nazionalizzazioni dei paesi in 
via di sviluppo nel periodo 1968-1979. Ne risulta che le variabili associate ai 
benefici della nazionalizzazione esercitano un’influenza attesa significativa in un 
modello di regressione binomiale.
I costi consistenti nello scoraggiamento dell’investimento diretto sono tratta­
ti in due modi. Primo, viene usato uno stimatore semiparametrico per analizzare 
l’eterogeneità non osservata nel modello binomiale; secondo, un modello Marko- 
viano per studiare la dipendenza dalle nazionalizzazioni nel tempo.
I risultati pongono in una luce nuova i comportamenti delle nazionalizzazio­
ni nel tempo per diversi paesi.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 1, 63-74
FORMS OF TRADE CONTROL 
IN AN EQUILIBRIUM NORTH-SOUTH MODEL 
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION <
by
M a s s im o  Di M a t t e o  *
Some years ago G. Chichilnisky (1981, 1984) presented a general 
equilibrium model of North-South trade where she criticized the adoption of 
export led policies by the South. It was shown that, under suitable condi­
tions, a higher level of exports of the labour intensive (basic) good could 
result in a fall in the terms of trade and in a lower level of consumption in 
the South.
The model used was a rather standard 2 X 2 X 2  model with fixed 
coefficients and variable factor supplies. Sufficient conditions to obtain the 
result were two, both concerning the South: labour is “abundant” with a 
meaning similar to that used by Arthur Lewis (1954); technology is “dual”, 
namely the labour-capital ratio is much higher in the basic than in the 
industrial sector.
These assumptions seem to represent a fairly good description of the 
conditions prevailing in a large part of the underdeveloped countries, so that 
the results need to be taken seriously by policy makers. They refer to 
structural features of the economy so that a long period of time is needed 
before these conditions can be altered.
In the meantime it is useful to look at the choices open to policy 
makers in the South with the minimum end of mitigating the effects of this *I
*  Department of Political Economy, University of Siena, Siena (Italy).
I am heavily indebted to G. Chichilnisky and G. Heal for endless discussions about the 
contents of the paper and related topics and in particular to G. Chichilnisky whose criticism 
helped in spotting a mistake in an earlier draft. I am also grateful to F. Casprini and A. Vercel- 
li for suggestions and encouragement. 1 am indebted to the University of Siena (fondi 60%) 
for financing my visits to the Department of Economics of Columbia University.
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unfavourable state of affairs or the more ambitious task of altering it com­
pletely.
It is interesting to note that in the model proposed by Chichilnisky a 
movement in the South’s terms of trade can be due to changes in the pattern 
of economic behaviour in the North. As an example an increase in the 
North’s demand for industrial goods leads to a fall in the terms of trade of 
the South.
The question therefore arises whether the South has any policy measure 
in order to reduce or to annul the loss in welfare. And granted that there 
are many options is there a most preferred action?
The aim of the paper is to review some of the measures that could be 
employed by the policy makers and to compare their effectiveness in achiev­
ing the goal. I will briefly present the model that I will use throughout the 
paper (Section 1). I will then modify it to the effect of incorporating various 
kinds of policy measures, present the results that follow and whenever 
feasible evaluate their effects on the economy of the South (Sections 2 and 
3). Some of the results will not be standard and will be briefly commented 
on together with remarks on the limitations of the analysis (Section 4).
1. As I said, I will employ a 2 X 2 X 2  model: two commodities (basic 
and industrial goods are produced and traded), two resources (labour and 
capital are employed to produce the commodities), and two (group of) 
countries are involved in trade (the North and the South). The structure of 
the model is simple and can be illustrated with reference to one country 
only. Features specific to each country are discussed below at appropriate 
places. Constant returns to scale are assumed to prevail in each sector, with 
a fixed coefficients technology. There are no intermediate goods: the sectors 
are vertically integrated. In equilibrium prices equal costs:
[1.1] pB = a1w + cl rpl
[1.2] P1 = a2w + c2 rp1 
where
pB (/>]) is the price of basic (industrial) good, w is the wage rate and r 
the rate of return and cij (c;) are the labour and capital coefficients in they-th 
industry.
D =  ax c2— a2 cx >  0: this implies that the basic sector is more labour 
intensive than the industrial.
Labour supply (Ls) is an increasing function of the real wage:
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[1.3] Ls =  aw/pB +  L0 where L0 >  0.
Following Chichilnisky’s original analysis “perverse” cases whereby la­
bour supply actually decreases when the real wage increases are ruled out. It 
can be assumed that the values for which the latter case will be true are not 
feasible in the present model (e.g. they could imply that the rate of return is 
zero or negative).
We also define a supply of capital (Ks) as an increasing function of the 
rate of interest
[1.4] Ks = fir +  K0 where K0 >  0.
This assumption is less palatable in so far as there is no other use for 
capital. However most of the results are valid in the case where ¡ 3 = 0 .  
Then we have the demand functions for capital and labour:
[1.5] KD = Bsc1 +  Is c2
[1.6] IP  = Bsal +  Is a2
where Bs {Is) is the supply of basic (industrial) goods.
Full employment of resources requires
[1.7] LD = Ls
[1.8] KD = Ks
Let us now specifically consider the economy in the South. It is as­
sumed that it will export (import) the basic (industrial) good. We have a 
definition of exports, XSB (5):
[1.9] Bs ( S ) - B d (S) = X sb (S). 
and of imports, X?  (5)
[1.10] ID (S) -  Is (S) = X? {S)
where ID (S) (BD (5)) is the demand for industrial (basic) goods in the 
South.
We now come to the trade balance condition, the value of exports 
equals the value of imports:
[1.11] PB X B (S) = PlX f  {S).
Equations for the North are the same except for different parameters
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and exogenous variables and for the fact that the North exports (imports) 
industrial (basic) goods. Finally there are other self explanatory conditions 
to be fulfilled in the international equilibrium:
[1.12]
£II2̂.s,
[1.13] Pb — Pb (N)
[1.14] XSB (5) =  X»  (N )
[1.15] X? (S) = X j (N ).
One among the latter two, however, is not independent of the other 
equations of the system.
Finally we have to choose the numeraire:
[1.16] P i=  1-
Therefore in the equation for the supply of labour w/pB is a measure of 
the real wage. The model need to be supplemented by two more equations 
representing demand conditions. Following Chichilnisky we choose to close 
the model by assuming:
[1.17] "3 On II °o O
n
[1.18] P  (N) =  !» (N)
It is also true that in equilibrium Walras’s Law holds in the South in 
the following form:
PbBd +  PlIs = pB (Bs -  XSB) + Pl (Is +  X?) = Pb Bs +  p,Is
In this way the model has 26 equations: 11 for each country, the 3 
international equations (one among [1.14] and [1.15] is redundant) and the 
numeraire equation. It turns out that the model can be reduced to one 
quadratic equation:
[A + A  (N)]p2B +  ypB -  [V +  V(N)] =  0
where
A =  [ja{ a2/-D2 >  0 
V = acj/D2 >  0
r  =  IS (S) + I$ (N ) + C + C (n )
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C =  [\/D]{c1 L0 -  a{ K0 +  [acl c2 -  fia\\/D} >  0
[when a (S) is very large]
are for the South (the corresponding for the North are with the (N)). To the 
above equation there is one positive solution. Once the latter is known all 
the others endogenous variables can be computed.
Chichilnisky argues that the South is characterized by two features: 
unlimited supply of labour and dual technology. The first implies that the 
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage is very large: in 
the model this is captured by a very large value of a. It is precisely to 
accomodate this feature that the model has variable factor supplies. With 
the second assumption we describe a situation where the labour/capital ratio 
is much higher in the basic than in the industrial sector: in the model this is 
reflected in a high value of D (5).
We briefly summarize one chain of deductions that can be derived 
from the model. A rise in the demand for industrial goods in the North is 
associated with a fall in the terms of trade for the South, a rise in its 
exports, and a fall in its overall consumption. Therefore the South is worse 
off. At the same time the North is better off since a fall in pB induces an 
increase in the demand for basic goods. In this way we see that there is a 
clear conflict of interests between North and South.
2. If the above situation presents itself, are there policy measures that 
can be implemented by the South, to alter or mitigate the results? We can 
imagine two different types, “micro” and “macro” measures. Among the first 
we include consumption subsidy, production tax, and export duty. If it is 
assumed that the government in the South can control ID (5) we have a 
“macro” weapon: a change in the demand for industrial goods.
2.1. Let us start from the case of a consumption tax levied on the 
basic good in the South. In this way a wedge is created between the price 
paid by the consumer and that obtained by the producer. The following 
relation holds true:
Pb ~  Pi T
where pcB is the price paid by the consumer, ppB is the price obtained by the 
producer and T =  1 +  / is the tax (subsidy is a negative tax).
Following the magisterial analysis by Meade (1955, ch. X) it is as­
sumed in the paper that the proceeds (outlays) of the tax (subsidy) are given
6 8 MASSIMO DI MATTEO
back to (are taken from) the consumers. In this way we isolate the “direct” 
effects of the tax (subsidy) from the “indirect” effects due to the way in 
which the government spends the proceeds or changes other taxes to cover 
the outlays. We assume also that:
=  P b
where pB is the world price. It is clear that in the North pB indicates the 
consumer’s and the producer’s prices.
Which equations of the model need to be modified? Labour supply 
will be affected by the consumer’s price; on the other hand the price equa­
tions will determine the producer’s price to which taxation is subsequently 
added. The supply of capital will be a function of pB, via the relation of the 
latter with the rate of interest. All other equations remain unaltered. We 
solve the model starting from:
X?  (5) =  X/ (N)
and substituting where appropriate we get the final quadratic equation as 
follows:
p \ \A + A (N)] +  pBy' -  [V /T  + V (N)] =  0.
This is equal to the expression we arrive at in the original model save for 
the term V /T  instead of V and for y' which is equal to y except that one 
positive term within it is multiplied by 1/T. In other words the introduction 
of a consumption tax leads to a fall in V and y: to ascertain the effect on the 
terms of trade we now compute (using the implicit function theorem):
SpB/SV =  l/{2pB [A + A (N)] +  y} >  0
and
Sps/Sy =  -  Pb/{2Pb [A +  A (N)] +  y} <  0.
Therefore the result is ambiguous depending on the relative strength of 
the two effects. We have a decrease in the terms of trade if
1 — pB > 0.
If this is the case a consumption subsidy (i.e. T =  1 — t) will increase 
the terms of trade.
The rationale for the result is as follows. A consumption tax makes the 
consumer’s price of basics higher than the producer’s price. The supply of
labour will be lower and this will increase the supply of industrial goods. 
With a given demand for the latter the price of basics will increase. This 
however (via the cost/price equation) will increase the real wage in terms of 
producer’s price and since the latter is linked to the consumer’s price will 
also increase the latter and the supply of labour. Therefore there will be two 
contrasting influences on the terms of trade: the net outcome is uncertain.
It is also to be noted the effects on the demand for basics in the South. 
The latter is derived from the operation of the Walras’s law which in the 
case of taxation takes on a slightly different form. We evaluate overall 
demand in the South at consumer’s price and output at producer’s price 
getting:
P% BD +  p,ID = pB (Bs -  XSB) +  ID +  X f
hence
BD =  [1 /715" + 0 s -  ID)/pBl
The above expression differs from the one that is arrived at in the 
original model simply by the term l/T . Therefore as in the original model 
the demand for basics is a positive function of the terms of trade so that a 
rise in the latter will increase it.
2.2. Let us now move on and suppose that the South levies a produc­
tion subsidy on the basic industry. This again opens a wedge between 
consumer’s and producer’s prices. In particular the following relation now 
holds true:
P̂B =  TpB
where T — 1 +  / but now p B =  pB i.e. the consumer’s price equals the 
world price. Again in the North there will be no difference between the 
world, the producer’s and the consumer’s prices.
In this case too cost/price relationships will be affected by producer’s 
price and labour supply by consumer’s price. To solve the model we start 
from:
X f  (5) =  X/ (N)
and after performing the appropriate substitutions we get the final quadratic 
equation:
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The only difference with the original model lies in ^4T instead of A. In 
other words a production subsidy on the basic commodity will increase A. 
In order to ascertain the feffect on the terms of trade we use the implicit 
function theorem and compute:
SpjJSA = -  p2B/{2pB [A + A  (N)] +  y} <  0.
In order to reach the goal of raising the terms of trade therefore the 
South needs a production tax, namely T =  1 — t. The latter implies a lower 
level of production prices and therefore a rise in the interest rate and the 
supply of capital. This in turn will shift the supply of the capital intensive 
good Is as in the diagram and the terms of trade will increase. This is in 
agreement with Meade’s result that a production tax will depress exports. 
The latter in this model will carry a rise in the terms of trade.
From of Trade Control in an Equilibrium North-South Model: A Comparative Evaluation.
We can check the value of the demand for basics in the South by 
resorting to Walras’s Law evaluating as in 2.1. the demand at the consum­
er’s and the output at the producer’s price. From
pB BD + ID = pPB (Bs -  XSB) +  Is +  X f 
and making the appropriate rearrangements we get 
Bd = [1/T][BS +  (Is -  ID)/pBl
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The only difference with the original expression is the term 1/T and 
therefore also in this case the demand for basics will increase with the terms 
of trade.
2.3. Only now we assume that the South levies an export duty on the 
exports of the basic commodity. In this way a wedge is created between the 
domestic price, pB (now equal for both the producer and the consumer) and 
the world price, pB. The following relation holds true:
Pb ? =  Pb
where T  =  1 +  t. The domestic price is now less than the world price. In 
this case the domestic price will affect both the labour and the capital 
supply. Proceeding as usual i.e. starting from
x ?  (S) =. X f (N)
we get the final equation:
[A/T  +  A (AT)] p \  +  ypB - [ V T + V  (N)] =  0.
We see immediately that the export duty affects both A  and V. In 
particular it will increase V and lower A. We already know that
SpB/SA <  0
and
SpB/SV > 0
and we conclude that an export duty will increase the terms of trade.
The result reached by Meade that an export duty will depress exports 
is confirmed now in a general equilibrium analysis. Thanks to the latter we 
are able to reach more definite results and see that the effect of the export 
duty on the terms of trade is always as desired and superior to that of the 
production tax.
In conclusion we maintain first that in this model levying an export 
duty or a production tax enables the South to reach the desired goal of 
increasing the terms of trade whereas this is not always the case with a 
consumption tax (or subsidy). This asymmetry is not present in the standard 
results reached by Meade and depends on the endogeneity of labour supply. 
Secondly it is clear that in this model the Lerner’s case (Lerner, 1936)
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can never happen, i.e. it is always the case that an export duty will increase 
the terms of trade.
3. Let us now discuss the “macro” policy. Suppose that in the South 
the government is the main element in determining the demand for indus­
trial goods. This can happen for various reasons: there is a strong dirigistic 
policy or a sort of planning, the industrial sector is in large part devoted to 
produce goods bought by the government, etc. This being the case, can the 
government change the demand for industrial goods in such a way that the 
terms of trade can improve?
The answer is immediate by use of the implicit function theorem. Start 
once again from:
X/ (N) =  X f (S)
which in turn is
Is (N ) -  Iq (N ) =  J0D (5) -  Is (S).
Therefore
8Pb/ 8I° (S) = l/{[81s (S)/8pB] +  [81s (N)/8pB]} <  0.
In other words a fall in the demand for industrial goods in the South 
will bring about an increase in the terms of trade. To complete the analysis 
we have to look at the effects on the demand for basics in the South:
8BD (S)/8ID (S) =  [8Bd/8Pb][8Pb/ 8Id] <  0.
Therefore the result of the “macro” policy has contrasting effects on 
the welfare of the South: on the one hand the demand for industrial goods 
fall, on the other the demand for basics increases, since in the South the 
demand for basic good is positively correlated to its price (see Chichilnisky, 
1981). Therefore we cannot say whether there is an improvement unless 
we have a way of evaluating the changes.
What we really need is a community indifference curve (CIC) that can 
weight the marginal changes in the quantity consumed of the two commodi­
ties. It is however well known that in general we cannot build such a curve 
unless we make drastic assumptions. One sufficient condition to have a CIC 
is that each agent has the same income and tastes.
Suppose as is traditional in the pure theory of international trade that 
evaluates the gains from trade, that there exists such a utility function Vs (I, 
B). Given the latter we can build a set of indifference curves in the plane (I,
TRADE CONTROL IN AN EQUILIBRIUM NORTH-SOUTH MODEL 73
B). Along one indifference curve pick a point with the combination V, B ". 
Then we compare the MRS along the CIC at that point of an infinitesimal 
change in ID (5) (following the government’s policy) with the actual change 
in BD due to the same change in ID (S). If the latter is greater than the MRS 
it means that the change in BD induced by the government action leads to a 
preferred position. This criterium has a local validity and the problem does 
not necessarily have an optimum solution in general.
4. The purpose of the paper has been that of evaluating a set of 
instruments of economic policy to ameliorate the welfare of the South in the 
context of the general equilibrium model originally proposed by Chichilnis- 
ky (1981, 1984). The reason was that Chichilnisky showed that to a rise in 
the exports of the South is associated a loss of welfare of the South itself.
The answer as expressed in this paper is in the affirmative, namely 
there are at least two ways whereby the South can certainly better its terms 
of trade and improve its welfare: it can levy a production tax or an export 
duty. The latter is the most efficacious one and is superior to the other. It is 
also shown that in the model under scrutiny the Lerner’s case cannot 
happen.
Moreover it is shown that “macro” policy has an ambiguous effect on 
the welfare. Finally it is important to stress that the paper has followed the 
tradition of the optimum tariff argument, namely retaliation is excluded. 
Indeed the study of a trade warfare is beyond the scope of the paper and 
calls for different tools of analysis.
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POLITICHE COMMERCIALI IN UN MODELLO DI EQUILIBRIO NORD- 
SUD: UNA VALUTAZIONE COMPARATIVA
Nell’articolo si passano in rassegna alcune misure di politica economica volte 
a migliorare il benessere del Sud nel contesto di un modello di equilibrio generale 
proposto da Chichilnisky (1984). In quest’ultimo infatti un aumento delle esporta­
zioni del Sud è associato a una diminuzione di benessere del Sud. Ci sono 
almeno due modi con i quali il Sud può migliorare la ragione di scambio: una 
tassa sulla produzione e un dazio sulle esportazioni. Quest’ultima è la misura piu 
efficace e in questo modello il caso di Lerner è escluso. Si fa anche vedere come 
una politica “macro” abbia effetti ambigui sul benessere.
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BUDGET DEFICITS
AND THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE
by
C h a o -s h u n  H u n g  *
I
There has been a rich literature dealing with the impacts of federal 
budget deficits, especially in the United States (see, for instance, Barth, Iden 
and Russek, 1984, 1985; Cebula, 1987, 1988, 1990; Evans, 1985; 
Hoelscher, 1983, 1986; and Zahid, 1988). This note seeks to add to that 
literature by investigating the impact of the budget deficit upon interest 
rates in the United States that directly affect the financial services industry. 
Given the beleaguered state of the Savings and Loan (hereafter simply “S & 
L”) industry in the United States (see Barth, 1991), in this empirical note, 
we focus specifically upon the S & L industry.
II
The crisis in the S & L industry in the United States in the 1980s has 
been discussed quite extensively (see, for example, Barth, 1991; and Cargill 
and Garcia, 1985). One well-recognized problem for the S & Ls, whose 
major role in the United States economy has been the provision of long term 
financing of real estate purchases, is the excessive exposure to “interest rate 
risk” resulting from borrowing short and lending long. Because of various 
tax and regulatory considerations, the S & Ls have typically had strong 
incentives to invest in fixed-rate long term mortgages. On the other hand, 
the main source of funds for S & Ls has typically been various shorter term
*  Florida Atlantic University, Department of Economics, Boca Raton, FL (U.S.A.).
7 6 CHAO-SHUN HUNG
depository instruments. Rising inflation in the 1980s acted to raise nominal 
interest rates, including the cost of funds, but since so many of the S & Ls’ 
loans were long term and fixed rate in nature, the S & Ls were caught in a 
profit squeeze that jeopardized their solvency.
There are two specific interest rate measures that are of particular 
significance to the profitability and solvency of the S & L industry: the cost 
of funds to S & Ls (COST) and the S & L mortgage portfolio yield 
(MORT). Based upon the above remarks, the former clearly affects the S & 
L cost structure, and the latter clearly affects the S & L revenue structure.
To investigate whether and to what extent the federal budget deficit in 
the United States may influence these two rates, we adopt the loanable 
funds model developed in Hoelscher (1986). That model is given by:
(1) R — f (P,  RSR, D, Y)
where:
R =  nominal rate of interest
P =  expected inflation
RSR — expected real short term interest rate 
D =  the federal budget deficit 
Y =  the change in per capita real GNP 
According to the Hoelscher (1986) model, the expected signs on the partial 
derivatives are as follows:
(2) • fp > 0, / r s r  >  °> / d >  °> / y =  unknown
Based on the above model, the following two regressions are suggest­
ed:
(3) COSTt =  <?q +  Pj +  # 2  RSRt 4- # 3  T  Yt -T v
(4) MORTt = bft -\- b^Pt -\- ¿2 RSRt 4- b3 Dt -T b^Yt w
where:
COSTt — average cost of funds to S & Ls in year t, expressed as a 
percent per year
MORTt — average S & L mortgage portfolio yield in year t, expressed 
as a percent per year
Pt =  expected inflation in year t, expressed as a percent per year
RSRt =  expected real average interest rate yield in year / on 13
week U.S. Treasury bills, expressed as a percent per year
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D, =  the federal budget deficit in year t, expressed in billions 
of 1982 dollars
Y =  change in per capita real GNP in year t, expressed in 1982 
dollars.
Variable COST, and MORTt are from the Savings & Home Financing 
Source Book. Variable Pt is the Livingston survey data, which was obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. RSRt is computed by sub­
tracting the expected inflation rate (Pt) from the nominal average interest 
rate yield on 13 week U.S. Treasury bills. The Treasury bill yield was 
obtained from the Economic Report o f the President, 1991, as was the U.S. 
federal budget deficit (Dt). Finally, Yt was computed using various data 
from the same source. All of the data are annual; this is because some of 
the data used (such as COSTt and MORTt) are available only in annual 
form. The time period studied runs from 1965-1989; some of the data, 
COST, and MORT„ for example, are unavailable before the year 1965. 
Based on (2) above, it is expected that:
(5) av bx >  0, a2, b2 >  0, a}, b} >  0, a4, b4 =  unknown
Estimating equations (3) and (4) by OLS in first-difference form (following 
Hoelscher, 1986), thereby allowing for nonstationarity of the variables in 
the analysis, yields equations (6) and (7), respectively:
(6) zCOST, =  0.07 +  0.39 zP, +  0.31 zRSR, +  0.74 zD, -  0.0001 zYt,
(+  3.46) (+  2.70) (+  1.72) ( -  1.74)
R2 =  0.51, DW =  1.62, Rho =  0.17
(7) zMORT, =  0.13 +  0.06 zP, +  0.2 zRSR, +  0.78 zD, -  0.00001 zY„
(+  2.08) (+  2.41) (+  2.85) ( -  1.00)
R2 =  0.50, DW =  1.60, Rho =  0.20
where terms in parentheses are /-values and “z” is the first-difference 
operator.
All of the estimated coefficients in equations (6) and (7) have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant at the ten percent level or 
beyond. Thus, both the expected inflation rate {p,) and the expected real 
short term interest rate yield on U.S. Treasury bills (RSR,) exercise a 
positive impact upon both COST, and MORT,. In terms of the objective of 
this note, the results for the deficit variable are perhaps the most relevant. 
In equation (3), the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable is positive
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but significant at only the ten percent level. On the other hand, in equation 
(7), the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable is positive and signifi­
cant at the one percent level. Thus, the evidence indicates that the deficit 
exercises only a modest impact on the S & L cost of funds (a comparatively 
short term rate), whereas the deficit exercises a positive and significant 
impact upon the S & L mortgage portfolio yield (a longer term rate).
In concert, the findings in equations (6) and (7) imply that:
(,a) federal budget deficits in the U.S. act to raise interest rates 
specifically affecting S & Ls;
(b) federal budget deficits in the U.S. impact more upon longer 
term rates that influence S & Ls than upon shorter term rates that affect S 
& Ls; and, based upon (b),
(c) federal budget deficits in the U.S. act to raise the slope of the 
yield curve confronting S & Ls.
Finding (a) is consistent with a number of previous studies, including 
Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985), Cebula (1987, 1988), Hoelscher 
(1986) and Zahid (1988). In addition, findings (b) and (c) are consistent 
with Cebula (1990).
I ll
This paper has empirically found that the budget deficit impacts 
significantly upon the S & L cost of funds and the S & L mortgage port­
folio yield in the United States. Apparently, as argued vehemently by 
Cebula (1988), the federal budget deficit in the United States significantly 
impacts upon the financial markets. On the other hand, there is no evidence 
that the federal budget deficit has exacerbated the “interest rate risk” 
problem faced by the S & Ls, since the S & L mortgage portfolio yield rose 
in response to the deficit but so did the S & L cost of funds, although much 
more modestly. Of course, the latter result may to some extent reflect the 
impact of “Regulation Q”, which until March of 1986 imposed interest rate 
ceilings on the rates that S & Ls could pay on savings and time deposits.
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DEFICIT DI BILANCIO E INDUSTRIA DEI SERVIZI FINANZIARI NEGLI 
STATI UNITI: NOTA EMPIRICA
Questo articolo esamina empiricamente l’impatto dei deficit federali di bilan­
cio negli Stati Uniti sui saggi di interesse che influenzano la redditività delle 
Associazioni di Risparmio e Prestiti. Queste istituzioni offrono finanziamenti a 
lungo termine per acquisti immobiliari, generalmente con fondi ottenuti sui mer­
cati a breve. I risultati dell’indagine indicano che il deficit reale di bilancio fa 
aumentare sia i saggi di interesse a lungo sia quelli a breve termine che influen­
zano le Associazioni di Risparmio e Prestiti e quindi che non vi sono palesi im­
patti avversi del deficit su queste istituzioni.
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1. Introduction
The pervasiveness of fiscal deficits among LDCs is a driving force 
behind renewed interest in the study of determinants and consequences of 
fiscal policy in the developing world. The recent literature in political 
economy suggests that political and institutional factors may help explain 
diverse national performance in fiscal policy* 1. Indeed, Roubini (1991) 
concludes that cross-country differentials in budget deficits depend on 
measures of political instability. Edwards and Tabellini (1991) reach a 
similar conclusion. Although it is often argued that government budget 
deficits will affect money supply and inflation, de Haan and Zelhorst 
(1990) find little support for this proposition. '
Many economists believe that several LDCs are following fiscal poli­
cies which are not sustainable in the long run. Building on recent work by 
Grilli et al. (1991) for a group of eighteen OECD countries, we examine in 
this paper whether fiscal policy is sustainable in a sample of 21 developing 
countries. We also analyze to what degree cross-country differences in the 
deficit to GDP ratio can be explained by political and/or institutional deter­
minants. Since the test for sustainability of fiscal policy requires a m in im u m  
number of observations, our sample of countries is considerably smaller 
than those of Roubini (1991) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991). However, 
our data set allows for a test of the politico-economic point of view, using 
data for the 1960s. We find that current fiscal policy in twelve out of the 21
*  Department of Economics, University of Groningen, Groningen (Netherlands).
The authors would like to thank Bas Bakker, Jan Jacobs, Flip de Kam and Ruud Koning 
for their comments on a previous version of this paper.
1 See P er sso n  and T a bellin i (1990) for a review of this approach.
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countries in our sample is not sustainable and that political instability may 
help explain cross-country differences in sustainability of budgetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at fiscal policy 
sustainability. Section 3 discusses the potential influence of political determi­
nants on fiscal policy sustainability. Finally, Section 4 summarizes our 
findings.
2. Fiscal Policy Sustainability
Assuming that government issues debt with a single-period maturity, 
the period-by-period government budget constraint can be written as:
(1) A B t =  r . B t _ x+ G , - T t
where Bt denotes the real value of government debt, r is the interest 
payable on that debt, Gt is real government expenditures exclusive of debt 
interest payments and Tt denotes real tax revenues.
Reformulating equation (1) and performing recursive substitution for 
all future debt yields:
(2) Bt =  .£  [1/(1 +  m S t+j  +  1/(1 +  r)"Bt + n 
where S is defined as:
(3) St =  T, -  Gt
If the limit of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is zero 
as n tends to infinity, then the outstanding stock of government debt equals 
the present value of future government surpluses.
(4) lim 1/(1 +  r)n Bt + n =  0n—> oo
In this case we call fiscal policy sustainable. There is a large literature 
on how to test equation (4), originating with Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
with more recent contributions from Grilli (1989), Trehan and Walsh 
(1991), Haug (1991), Bohn (1991) and Grilli et al. (1991)2. In this liter­
ature a number of tests have been advanced. Trehan and Walsh (1991) 
recently argued that some of these tests may not be applicable under some 
likely circumstances. They recommend to test whether the deficit inclusive 
of interest payments, i.e. S, -  rBt_ 1 is a stationary variable. We employ
2 See de H aan and Siermann (1991) for a review.
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this test for a sample of 21 developing countries. Following Bohn (1991) 
and Grilli et al. (1991) we use ratios of fiscal variables to GDP. After all 
a nation’s productive activity is the basis for all taxation, so the government 
sector is presumably bounded by the size of the whole economy. Data are 
taken from the IMF’s International financial Statistics. The inclusive-of- 
interest deficit (DEF) is reported in line 80 and Gross Domestic Product is 
in line 99b. The Appendix presents the average deficit-to-GDP ratio for all 
countries in our sample. As follows from the Appendix thé longest possible 
sample period is 1960-1989, the shortest sample period is 1960-1978 
(Malta).
To test whether a variable is stationary, the Dickey-Fuller and the 
Phillips-Perron tests are available. The Dickey-Fuller tests are based upon 
the assumption of the independence and homoscedasticity of the errors of 
the model. Since this is a rather restrictive assumption, we have chosen the 
Phillips-Perron tests, that allow for weakly dependent and heteroskedastic 
errors.
Our testing strategy is based upon Perron (1988) 3. We first test the 
existence of a unit root against the more general alternative of a stationary 
autoregressive model with drift and time trend. The test statistic is Z (7j. 
If the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected, there is no need to further 
proceed with the tests. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, this may 
be due to the low power of the test statistics, if the drift is zero. We test 
for the absence of the drift parameter using the statistic Z (0 2). If the joint 
hypothesis of a zero drift and trend parameter and a unit root cannot be 
rejected, we test the unit root against more restrictive alternatives, i.e. a 
stationary autoregression model with drift Z (i?*) and a pure autoregressive 
model Z (ta). Note that all statistics can be calculated with different trunca­
tion parameters (see Perron, 1988, for further details). We have calculated 
the various test statistics using various truncation parameter values (1 to 7). 
The results prove not to be very sensitive with respect to the choice of 
the truncation parameter. We only show the outcomes for a truncation 
parameter value of 5. Table 1 presents results for our sample of 21 develop­
ing countries using DEF/GDP as the relevant deficit measure.
Testing outcomes are mixed. At the 5 percent level the hypothesis that 
fiscal policy is unsustainable -  i.e. that the ratio of the deficit inclusive 
interest payments to national income is non-stationary -  can be rejected for 
nine countries, i.e. El Salvador, South-Korea, Malta, Pakistan, Paraguay, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. For the remaining
5 G r ill i et al. (1991) employ the sam e testing strategy.
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T a ble  1
TESTING FOR SUSTAINABLE FISCAL POLICY
Dependent variable: DEF/GNP
Z G a) Z (<t>2) Z ( /a) Z G a)
Columbia -  2.19 1.62 -  2.21 -  1.55
Ecuador -  2.47 2.01 -  1.89 -  1.68
El Salvador -  2.75 2.33 -  2.55 -  1.95
Greece -  1.80 2.79 1.44 3.11
Guatemala -  2.21 1.68 -  2.22 -  1.22
Honduras -  2.13 1.47 -  1.72 -  1.16
India -  1.97 1.42 -  1.09 0.57
Jamaica -  2.05 1.55 -  1.46 -  0.34
Korea -  5.32
Malaysia -  1.87 1.88 -  2.44 -  0.76
Malta -  4.42
Nepal -  2.42 2.78 -  0.36 0.48
Pakistan -  3.63
Paraguay -  3.63
Peru -  3.09 2.61 -  2.45 -  1.18
Philippines -  5.57
South Africa -  3.67
Sri Lanka -  3.48 3.75 -  2.45 -  0.13
Thailand -  1.77 1.56 -  2.28 -  1.27
Venezuela -  3.46 3.43 -  3.43 -  3.43
Yugoslavia -  4.24
Critical values 10% 5% 2.5% 1%
Z ( ta) -  3.24 -  3.60 -  3.95 -  4.38
Z  (02) 4.67 5.68 6.75 8.21
z ( 0 -  2.63 -  3.00 -  3.33 -  3.75
ZQa) -  1.60 -  1.95 -  2.26
-  2.66
twelve countries the outcomes of the Phillips-Perron tests suggest that 
current fiscal policy is not sustainable. This implies that sooner or later 
these countries will have to make fundamental budget adjustments. 3
3. Political and Economic determinants o f Public Debt
Can international differences in sustainability of fiscal policy be ex-
GOVERNMENT DEBT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8 5
plained by variations in political incentives faced by the governments? Grilli 
et al. (1991) discern a class of models in which political instability (i.e. the 
likelihood that a government will be thrown out of office) and polarization 
(i.e. the degree of disagreement between alternating policy-makers) may 
matter for public debt growth. For instance, Persson and Svensson (1989) 
demonstrate that a conservative government, which is in favor of a low level 
of public consumption but knows that it will be replaced by a government 
in favor of a higher level of public consumption, will borrow more than 
when it expects to stay in office. For a two party system Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990) show that public debt will increase with the degree of 
polarization between alternating governments, the time that elapses between 
government changes and with the chance of not being re-elected. Basically, 
these models imply that the more unstable and polarized political systems 
are, the more they behave myopically and, therefore, public debt will be 
larger.
In this section we will examine to what degree political and institution­
al differences have affected fiscal policy in our sample of 21 LDCs. We 
first employ the same strategy as Roubini (1991) and Edwards and Tabelli­
ni (1991) and estimate cross-section models for government debt growth in 
which proxies for political instability and polarization are used as explanato­
ry variables.
A first measure of political stability is the fractionalization rate (Frac) 
(i.e. the probability that two random chosen members of parliament are of 
different parties). A high fractionalization rate often implies (weak) coali­
tion governments and low levels of government durability (see Grilli et ah, 
1991). Following Roubini (1991) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991) we 
have used the total number of government transfers (NGT) as a second 
indicator for political stability. We also differentiate between regular trans­
fers (RGT) and irregular government transfers (Coup). Following Cukierman 
et al. (1989) we consider the number of coups as a measure of polarization. 
A second indicator for polarization is the inequality of the personal income 
distribution as measured through the Gini coefficient (the difference be­
tween the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality)4. All data on 
political indicators are taken from the World Handbook of Political and 
Social Indicators by Taylor and Jodice (1983). Following Roubini (1991)
4 Alesina and D razen (1991) show that a “war of attrition” between two social classes 
can delay stabilization policies. The delaying factor in their model is who will bear the tax 
burden of stabilization. The model implies that a greater dispersion in the income distribution 
and a lower degree of political cohesion will cause delay in the date of stabilization and will 
therefore imply a prolonged period of fiscal imbalance.
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we also add GDP per capita and the growth rate of GDP as explanatory 
variables. GDP per capita is taken as indicator for economic backwardness. 
Poor countries are likely to have more inefficient tax systems and may 
therefore be more prone to fiscal deficits. The growth rate of GDP is 
included in the regression to proxy for the different degree with which 
countries have faced recessions.
We have data for three periods of five years, starting with 1963. Data 
for the fractionalization rate are only available for a sample of twelve coun­
tries in the period 1963-1967 and for sixteen countries over the years 
1973-1977. Data on the Gini coefficient are only available for the year
Columns (l)-(3) of Table 2 present estimation results of the model 
with (regular and irregular) transfers together with real growth and GDP 
per capita as explanatory variables. Only for the period 1968-1972 we find 
that the coefficient of the number of government transfers is different from 
zero at the 5%  significant level for our sample of 21 developing countries . 
The sign of GDP per capita variable is correct, but its coefficient is statisti-
Table 2
BUDGET DEFICITS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS
Explanatory
variable:













Constant -  3.718 -  1.168 -  5.020 -  3.559 -  1.143 -  5.043
(-  2.45) (0.811) (-  3.72) (-  2.30) (-  0.77) (-  3.58)
NGT -  0.158 -  0.766 -  0.004
(-  1.06) (-  2.20) (-  0.01)
RGT -  0.218 -  0.718 0.033
(-  1.27) (-  1.68) (0.07)
Coup 0.479 -  0.898 -  0.096
(0.54) (- 1.24) (-  0.11)
GDP/Capita 0.0023 0.0009 0.0004 0.0026 0.0009 0.0004
(1.19) (0.62) (0.36) (1.28) (0.54) (0.35)
Growth rate 24.91 -  11.95 34.58 20.21 -  11.98 34.75
of GDP (0.92) (-  0.58) (2.36) (0.71) (-  0.56) (2.29)
R 2 -  0.001 0.12 0.12 -  0 03 0.07 0.06
Note: /-values are shown in parentheses.
’ This conclusion does not change when (regular and/or irregular) transfer(s) is/are the 
only explanatory variable(s).
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cally insignificant. Moreover, the sign of the growth rate of GDP is correct 
and significant for the last period. When we add the Gini coefficient as an 
explanatory variable (for the period 1968-1972) it turns out that its coeffi­
cient has the wrong sign and is not significantly different from zero (not 
shown).
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 present results when government transfers 
are split into regular (RGT) and irregular transfers (Coup). It is interesting 
that the coefficient of the coup variable has sometimes the wrong sign and 
has a lower level of significance than the coefficient of RGT. Similar results 
are reported by Roubini (1991), but Edwards and Tabellini (1991) con­
clude that in their regressions coups generally have a higher and more 
significant estimated coefficient.
Table 3 shows results with the fractionalization rate as explanatory 
variable. For the period 1963-1967 we find that all coefficients have the 
correct sign but are statistically insignificant. For the second period the 
coefficient of the fractionalization rate is insignificant and has even the 
wrong sign.
T a ble  3








Constant -  3.627 (-  0.59) -  5.138 (-  2.43)
GDP/capita 0.004 (1.44) +  0.000 (0.07)
Growth GDP 42.40 (0.69) 33.07 (2.08)
Frac -  3.934 (-  0.59) 1.661 (0.46)
R 2 0.05 0.11
N o t e : /-values are shown in parentheses.
Following a similar approach of Roubini (1991) and Edwards and 
Tabellini (1991), and in sharp contrast to the conclusions of these authors, 
we find only very limited support for the view that political stability may 
explain cross-country differences in fiscal deficits. However, a closer reading 
of Edwards and Tabellini (1991) suggests that our results are not at odds 
with the outcomes of the latter authors. Although they conclude that their
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measure of political instability “is significant for a large number of regres­
sions” (p. S38), its coefficient is in fact significant in only five out of forty 
eight regressions.
In the remainder of this section we will use another approach which 
builds upon the results reported in Section two, where we found that our 
sample of 21 developing countries can be split into two groups according to 
the sustainability of their fiscal policies. We estimate a probit model:
I* = P'Xj +  st with Ej ~  N  (0,1)
where I* is the latent inclination of a country to have a sustainable fiscal 
policy and xt is a vector of explanatory variables 6. As the first explanatory 
variable we take the number of (regular and/or irregular) government 
transfers as indicators of political instability or polarization. The second 
explanatory variable is either GDP per capita or the GDP rate of growth
T a ble  4
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY
Explanatory
variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 2.08 1.79 0.81 0.96 -0 .02 -0 .49 2.27
(1.34) (1.04) (0.78) (0.79) (-0.05) (-0.58) (1.89)
NGT -1.61 -1.61
(-  1.73) (-  1.80)
RGT -1.14 -1.13 -1.40
(-1.59) (-1.69) (-1.65)
Coup -1.73 -1 .75 -2.41
(-1.84) (-1.96) (-1.90)
GDP/capita 0.55 1.20 0.55
(0.52) (1.12) (0.65)
Growth GDP 11.27 7.48 13.97
(0.59) (0.50) (1.01)
X2 (2) 11.62* 11.68* 7.78" 6.62" 5.78 6.24" 11.96*
N o t e : " is significant at 5%. 
* is significant at 1%.
6 We observe:
Ij =  1 if country i has a sustainable fiscal policy and 
I, =  0 otherwise.
Then the probabilities Pr (/, =  1) =  Pr (I "t >  0) =  1 — Pr (I* <  0) =  1 — Pr (r, <  — 
/?'*,) =  1 — F  (— fi'xj) =  F (P'xj), with F  being a normal distribution function.
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as indicator for the state of the economy. The model predicts a policy to 
be sustainable if I* >  0. As shown by Judge et al. (1982) it is possible to 
estimate a probit model using maximum likelihood.
The maximum likelihood estimation results are given in Table 4. The 
coefficients of the number of government transfers in columns ( 1 )-(2) have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
parameter of GDP per capita has the expected sign, but is not statistically 
significant. Similar results are found when GDP per capita is replaced by for 
the GDP growth rate. When the government transfers are differentiated 
into regular and irregular alterations the coefficients keep the right sign, but 
the coefficients of regular transfers are no longer significant at the 10% 
level (columns (3)-(6)). Note that when we include both coups and regular 
transfers (column (7) in Table 4) the coefficient of irregular government 
transfers is higher than the coefficient of regular government transfers.
Following Judge et al. (1982) we finally test whether the political and 
economic variables have no impact on the inclination of a country to follow 
a sustainable fiscal policy. The null hypothesis that the explanatory variables 
have no impact on the probability of having a sustainable fiscal policy can 
be rejected at the 5% level, for all probit estimates except for the one 
reported in column 5 7.
4. Summary
In this paper we have examined whether fiscal policy in a number of 
developing countries is sustainable, following the test as proposed by Tre- 
han and Walsh (1991). This test examines the stationarity of the ratio of the 
deficit inclusive interest payments and GDP. Results of the Phillips-Perron
7 We test the hypothesis that the explanatory variables have no impact, that is, (i j =
=  0. Let 1 (12) be the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the restricted model:
J*  =  /?o +  £, with £, ~  N (0,1).
Let l  (cj) be defined the same for the unrestricted model:
f *  =  Po  +  P ]X U +  /?2*2 i +  e i
The test statistic is then:
-  2 [In/ (12) -  In (w)]"’3’ x 2 (k)
where k  is the number of explanatory variables, in our case k — 2. The critical values of a 
X2 (2) distribution at the 5% and 1% significance levels are 5.99 and 9.21, respectively.
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stationarity tests are mixed: in nine out of 21 countries fiscal policy is 
sustainable.
We have employed the results of the sustainability test to create a 
dependent 0-1 variable for a cross-country probit estimate of political and 
economic determinants on the likelihood of having a sustainable fiscal pol­
icy. We find that the likelihood of having a sustainable fiscal policy is 
negatively related to the number of (regular and/or irregular) government 
transfers. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that fiscal policy of 
unstable governments is more likely to be unsustainable.
APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICITS INCLUSIVE INTEREST PAYMENTS (DEF)
Country Sample period: DEF/GDP
Colombia 1960-1987 -  0.014
Ecuador 1960-1989 -  0.017
El Salvador 1960-1989 -  0.012
Greece 1960-1988 -  0.045
Guatemala 1960-1988 -  0.017
Honduras 1960-1988 -  0.027
India 1960-1988 -  0.053
Jamaica 1960-1986 -  0.084
Korea 1960-1989 -  0.011
Malaysia 1960-1989 -  0.072
Malta 1960-1978 -  0.016
Nepal 1960-1989 -  0.029
Pakistan 1960-1989 -  0.064
Paraguay 1960-1984 -  0.002
Peru 1960-1985 -  0.034
Philippines 1960-1989 -  0.015
South Africa 1960-1989 -  0.036
Sri Lanka 1960-1988 -  0.083
Thailand 1960-1988 -  0.026
Venezuela 1960-1986 -  0.003
Y ugoslavia 1960-1986 -  0.014
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SULLA SOSTENIBILITÀ E LE DETERMINANTI POLITICHE DEL DEBI­
TO PUBBLICO NEI PAESI IN VIA DI SVILUPPO
Viene qui esaminato per 21 paesi se la politica fiscale è sostenibile e in 
quale misura le differenze di politica fiscale fra paesi possono essere spiegate da 
determinanti politiche. Si trova che nel campione in esame la politica fiscale cor­
rente in 12 paesi non è sostenibile. Seguendo un approccio simile a quelli di 
Rubini (1991) e Edwards e Tabellini (1991) e decisamente in contrasto con le 
loro conclusioni, gli autori del presente articolo trovano poco a sostegno dell’opi­
nione che la stabilità politica possa spiegare le differenze fra paesi nel livello del 
loro deficit fiscale. Tuttavia, l’instabilità politica può aiutare a spiegare le diffe­
renze fra paesi nella sostenibilità della politica fiscale.
RECENSIONI E LIBRI RICEVUTI
Bartoli H.: L ’économie multidimensionnelle. 1991, Paris, Economica, pp. 527, F. 195.
Sia ad apertura di libro -  ch’è la prima curiosità di ogni bibliofilo -  sia percorrendo 
l’indice degli argomenti -  ch’è il « tableau » delle indicazioni per i luoghi del libro dove 
procedere e dove fermarsi -  ho provato sorprendente agio per stesso mondo di cultura e di 
civilizzazione, e per raccolta ragionata di materiali teorici e dottrinari che puntano sistematica- 
mente a una conoscenza totalizzante dell’azione umana attraverso l’economia politica intesa nella 
solidarietà dei rapporti endo-esogeni come — radice parziale Knies — dalla Scuola del professor 
Demaria, che qui si ritrova con ampiezza ed empatia, specialmente nelle pagine 447-501.
Il libro — di sbalorditiva erudizione -  è complesso e multidimensionale come la scienza 
eponima del titolo, ed è un libro a edificazione di cultura personale prima ancora che di ricerca 
puramente scientifica quale risulta dalla «Tavola delle materie» qui di seguito riesposta. La 
Parte I, L ’economia multidimensionale come progetto, partendo da l’economia e suo ambiente,, 
dice l’impossibile isolamento della scienza economica stessa onde la permanenza travagliata 
della linea della multidimensionalità cui si connette la partizione dei campi d’investigazione 
scientifica e, altresì, la crisi dell’economicismo contemporaneo. Tematica su cui Bartoli s’appog­
gia per un procedimento multidimensionale onde la necessità di rompere l’isolamento della 
tradizionale « economia pura » consentendone l’apertura all’esogeneità, ossia all’extraeconomia, e 
dunque all’ambiente generale nelle sue espressioni fenomeniche. Argomentazioni che impongono 
questioni di metodo fra le quali è massima la reintroduzione delle variabili escluse e l’apertura 
alla multidimensionalità con la specificazione di una econometria novatrice quando cosciente dei 
limiti che gli impone la multidimensionalità stessa. La Parte II, Razionalità economica e 
razionalità metaeconomica, tratta della genesi del razionalismo economico e della irrazionalità 
della ragione economica unidimensionale. Tematica che rinvia alla razionalità metaeconomica e 
all’articolazione del razionale e del ragionevole con l’approdo alla ragione aperta (qui avremmo 
visto volentieri un richiamo al Popper della società aperta che, invece, appare solo sulla 
problematica delle leggi « locali » con Hayek) il tutto con la convenienza collettiva e relativo 
ritorno all’economia politica. La Parte III, Equilibrio e regolazione, vede l’equilibrio generale 
sostituito dalla regolazione e i limiti della teoria dell’equilibrio generale in quanto teoria della 
regolazione. Passando dall’individuale al gruppale, Bartoli va all’equilibrio macroeconomico e 
alla regolazione del macrocosmo con l’opportunità di rileggere (criticamente) J.M. Keynes per 
trattare il passaggio dalla piena occupazione alla crescita equilibrata (giustamente qui troviamo 
il von Neumann 1937 da cui il teorema dell’« autostrada ») quale idea regolatrice e complemen­
tare così da condurre il discorso con le teorie del disequilibrio e il rinnovo delle politiche di 
regolazione e — un patto ritenuto modernissimo — le anticipazioni razionali e il ritorno alla 
regolamentazione libera. Anche qui il richiamo all’equilibrio metaeconomico e alla regolazione 
importa la multidimensionalità e la regolazione, la simmetria, l’ordine e la regolazione. La Parte 
IV, Degli itinerari discernibili, attraversa multidimensionalità e determinismo partendo da alcuni
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principi necessari di intellegibilità che importano concetti ampliati e rinnovati con le questioni 
della misura, superando nell’unità la dicotomia quantità e qualità. L ’approdo multidimensionali­
tà e complessità richiede, dunque, nuovi principi assolutamente necessari d’intellegibilità e 
l’impegno di gestire o amministrare la complessità onde il completamento con la « mano 
visibile », il richiamo delle biografie che rappresentano sempre tipi reali e all’indeterminazione 
logica (direbbe Demaria) suggerisce la critica di quella teoria povera e fittizia costituita dai 
modelli, schemi conoscitivi ubbidienti sempre e soltanto alla logica del come se.
La Conclusione (pp. 505-14) non è un congedo -  forse un approdo -  giacché problemi 
« grossi » quali ambiente, disoccupazione, povertà, crescita, indebitamento internazionale, costru­
zione della nuova Europa, sono problemi economici che — comunque intesi dal punto di vista 
degli individui, delle imprese, delle nazioni -  non sono riconducibili alla sola « economia » 
tradizionale, giacché unidimensionale, perché la complessità è la legge suprema dell economia, 
scienza fondamentalmente multidimensionale. Ecco perché, dopo una breve anamnesi del 
persistere nella storia delle dottrine economiche di una linea della multidimensionalità, Bartoli 
procede con determinata decisione a reperire gli itinerari per una economia multidimensionale. 
Ed ecco perché svolge, in connessione, un esame critico tanto della razionalità economica, 
quanto dell’equilibrio riferendosi alla multidimensionalità dei fenomeni e dei processi economi­
ci. Ed ecco, infine, perché ulteriori itinerari sono da Bartoli anticipati nei principi d’intellegibili­
tà puntando anche qui a concetti tanto ampliati quanto rinnovati, e soprattutto all’introduzione 
delle dimensioni qualitative senza rinunciare alle dimensioni quantitative in una totalità di 
strumenti che Bartoli riafferma sempre indispensabili alla ricerca.
Abbiamo cercato di dare sinteticamente i punti chiave della « visione » di Bartoli — 
giacché, se da ognuno si può partire, tutti sono necessari -  « visione » che propone un sistema 
multidimensionale dell’economia politica come mosaico di tessere coerentemente innestate luna 
nell’altra. Potrebbe essere un « autodafé » di quasi ogni economista teorico contemporaneo? 
Potrebbe essere un « invito » ai tre volumi del Trattato di logica economica, 1962-74 di 
Giovanni Demaria? I due interrogativi sono, per noi, retorici giacché abbiamo sì bisogno di 
conoscere e interpretare il mondo reale e sensibile, ma v’è una perplessità che -  nell’approdo 
del libro -  risorge giusto con Bartoli-Lombardini-Wiener e ha nome cibernetica. Cerchiamo di 
ragionarci, perché a noi sembra che il traguardo di Bartoli sia la cibernetica onde la ripetuta 
simpatia per Lange e altri.
Possiamo anche concordare -  ritenendola un’ipotesi forte, ossia irrealistica, in questo 
spazio-tempo di fine Novecento -  sull’inesistenza di una « mano invisibile » alla Smith onde la 
necessità a noi contemporanea di gestire la complessità della prasseologia umana, perché 
un’azione « razionale » non è mai sottomessa alla sola « razionalità » strumentale, giacché -  per 
Bartoli -  è sempre travagliata da una intenzione etica. Progetto dell’uomo, l’economia politica -  
condotta dai metodi della scienza — deve prendere le parti dell’uomo, guidata da un’etica della 
responsabilità. Tale lo scopo del libro di Bartoli. Ma ecco il punto: il nostro sospetto è che -  
nell’età dell’informatica -  l’economista teorico puntando decisamente al paradiso informatico (e 
valendosi del personal computer) si trovi immerso più o meno consapevolmente nella « realtà 
virtuale »: una realtà che non c’è, ma che a tutti gli effetti è come ci fosse. Colui che la prova 
transita completamente in un altro piano dell’esistenza, in un’allucinazione. La realtà virtuale 
emerge da una tecnologia super raffinata (era l’intuizione-pericolo del qui taciuto Spengler, Der 
Mensch und die Technik, 1931?), cioè il massimo nel campo dei computer e della trasmissione 
televisiva, così che -  se colui che la prova è trasognato -, colui che la predispone è destissimo 
e attentissimo: è un professionista della più avanzata tecnologia. La « realtà virtuale » è 
un’apparecchiatura computerizzata, quello che in termini tecnici si dice un « simulatore » (chi 
ha praticato l’aeronautica e il volo sa di tali apparecchiature a terra), cioè un produttore di
RECENSIONI E LIBRI RICEVUTI 9 5
immagini e sensazioni che imitano la realtà in modo totale. Ci si chiede se il paradiso artificiale 
della realtà virtuale non rischi di portare l’uomo fuori del mondo, di svilupparne il lato non 
verbalizzabile, di fargli smarrire l’individualità, di trasferirlo in un’allucinazione. Facendo 
conoscere il mondo della realtà virtuale, bisogna considerare questi pericoli come il vero e 
auspicabile effetto dell’ingresso della nostra mente nel computer. La realtà virtuale è forse 
quella che Galilei, nelle lezioni degli anni grandi di Padova, diceva il mondo di carta di contro 
al mondo sensibile (Bartoli lo ricorda a p. 507, ma non lo assume a radice in vista dell’approdo 
bensì a memento nella « Conclusione »), mondo sensibile unico che lo scienziato deve interpreta­
re onde Bartoli ancora a p. 507 scrive « L ’homme est un projet à Service de la Vie »: 
qualunque il carattere (sempre interno) che è il progetto, sono i motivi (sempre esterni) -  
dunque la vita (imprevedibilmente creatrice) -  a condurre il tutto! Schopenhauer si ritroverebbe 
in piena ortodossia.
Siamo dunque alla cibernetica di Wiener con Bartoli a p. 462 e a p. 494, ma siamo anche 
alla « realtà virtuale » termine creato da Jaron Lanier che l’ha descritta come « una macchina 
col potenziale di creare sogni comuni in stato di veglia »: « shared waking-state dreams ». 
L ’apparecchio può variare da un ordinario personal computer -  che consente di passeggiare in 
un luogo che interessa -  a un super computer -  che simula l’immersione totale in un mondo 
immaginario, in cui ogni movimento del partecipante è catturato da sensori e l’esperienza viene 
esaltata da suoni ed effetti tattili. Come accennato, la realtà virtuale trova già applicazione da 
alcuni lustri nel campo della simulazione del volo aeronautico e astronautico.
Coniughiamo il mondo economico reale con l’essenza radicale della scienza economica, ch’è 
lo scambio, e — costruendo spiegazioni dai « dati di partenza » empirici endogeni ed esogeni — 
diamo campo sia all’informatica sia alla computerizzazione, ma non dobbiamo non possiamo 
non vogliamo muoverci lungo strade di fascinosi irrealismi onde all’economista ricordiamo — 
come parabola -  la storia del biologo parigino che, per tutta la vita, aveva scritto sui 
coccodrilli. Dopo la sua monumentale e definitiva opera sull’argomento, visitò l’Africa per 
vedere un coccodrillo. Uno di essi avanzò verso il biologo che si arrampicò su un albero. Il 
coccodrillo allora si impennò e si arrampicò dietro di lui. « Mais non! Mais non! » esclamò lo 
scienziato, « les crocodiles ne montent pas les arbres! ».
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